Is Jordan helping Russia? What the money flows show
Jordan's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€5m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €178m (0.34% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€187m; the other parts take €9m off it). The net is 0.35% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.02% to 0.61% toward Russia; very likely · 97%).
likely 0.02% to 0.61% toward Russia · €183m · ≈ 0.07%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.35% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€5m
likely from 0.11% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.34%
€178m
likely <0.01% to 0.58% toward Russia very likely · 96%
Russia kept €178m (0.34% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€187m; the other parts take €9m off it).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.34% of GDP more (€178m; likely <0.01% to 0.58% toward Russia)
Jordan's own gain from trade with Russia: Jordan kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.01% toward Russia to <0.01% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
Rough data: mostly estimates 86% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €187m of the net's €183m.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €5m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€3m
Jordan kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€2m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.34% · €178m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.36%
€187m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.03%
€18m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.01%
€7m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−<0.01%
€1m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC
−<0.01%
€1m
Jordan kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€92m.
It bought €0.18bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.16bn in 2025 (−10%). It sold €15m to Russia in 2021 and €4m in 2025 (−75%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 9.9% of what it bought from Russia. For Jordan: €7m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 43% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Jordan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Jordan. Checked 27 October 2026.
18 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 11 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 14% modelled (C) and 86% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Sources, by part
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
In money terms the net is −0.35% of one year's GDP (likely 0.02% to 0.61% toward Russia; very likely · 97%). Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €178m (0.34% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€187m; the other parts take €9m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Jordan trade with Russia?
It bought €0.16bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.18bn in 2021), and sold €4m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €178m (0.34% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€187m; the other parts take €9m off it).
How does Jordan compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Palestine +0.09%, Israel +<0.01%, Iraq −0.22%, Saudi Arabia −0.30%, Jordan −0.35%, Syria −1.0%. In the map's ranking: number 25 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
We found no sanctions of Jordan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Jordan.