War Balance
Lesotho's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept <€1m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.01% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Ukraine by
0.01% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine · <€1m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.01% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 80%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.01%
<€1m
likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept <€1m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war.
Chance toward Ukraine: 80%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.01% · <€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<0.01% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<0.01% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<0.01% |
| 2025 | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<0.01% |
| 2026* | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | +0.01% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For Lesotho: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Lesotho's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Lesotho. Checked 27 October 2026.
Its net is essentially zero: +0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
In money terms the net is +0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 80%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept <€1m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
We found no sanctions of Lesotho's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Lesotho.
Essentially zero
УкраїнськаDeutschFrançaisPolskiNederlandsEspañol
Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/lesotho/