Is Saudi Arabia helping Russia? What the money flows show
Saudi Arabia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.36bn (0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €3.9bn (0.33% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.30% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.08% to 0.52% toward Russia; very likely · 99%).
likely 0.08% to 0.52% toward Russia · €3.5bn · ≈ 0.06%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.30% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.03%
€359m
likely <0.01% to 0.05% essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.33%
€3.9bn
likely 0.11% to 0.55% toward Russia very likely · 99%
Russia kept €3.9bn (0.33% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.33% of GDP more (€3.8bn; likely 0.11% to 0.55% toward Russia)
Saudi Arabia's own gain from trade with Russia: Saudi Arabia kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€20m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to <0.01% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €1.3bn over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 212% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.1bn in 2021, €3.5bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €4.2bn of the net's €3.5bn.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.03% · €359m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.03%
€366m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€38m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€31m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.33% · €3.9bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−0.36%
€4.2bn
Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC
+0.04%
€478m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−<0.01%
€76m
Russia kept more from weapons sold hereD
−<0.01%
€25m
Saudi Arabia kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€16m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC
−<0.01%
€13m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−<0.01%
€5m
Saudi Arabia's companies made more profit in RussiaD
−<0.01%
€4m
Saudi Arabia kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€1m
Saudi Arabia kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€0.96bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €13m in 2022 to €8m in 2025.
It bought €1.1bn from Russia in 2021 and €3.5bn in 2025 (+212%). It sold €69m to Russia in 2021 and €67m in 2025 (−2%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 15.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Saudi Arabia: €478m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Saudi Arabia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0m
€0m
€25m
–
Oil products
€6.3bn
€6bnrange €4.4bn to €7.7bn
€17bn
C (estimate)
Coal
€79m
€75mrange €54m to €0.10bn
€4m
C (estimate)
Other goods
€7.5bn
€9.5bn
–
All goods
€13.9bn
€15.5bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: C, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Saudi Arabia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Saudi Arabia. Checked 27 October 2026.
30 sources back its parts: 7 official statistics, 7 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 7% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 91% modelled (C) and 2% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −0.30% of one year's GDP (likely 0.08% to 0.52% toward Russia; very likely · 99%). Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €3.9bn (0.33% of GDP) more than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Saudi Arabia–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €3.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.1bn in 2021), and sold €67m to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.36bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −0.30% of one year's GDP (likely 0.08% to 0.52% toward Russia; very likely · 99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Saudi Arabia trade with Russia?
It bought €3.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.1bn in 2021), and sold €67m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €3.9bn (0.33% of GDP) more than without the war.
How much has Saudi Arabia given to Ukraine?
Saudi Arabia's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.36bn, 0.03% of one year's GDP (likely <0.01% to 0.05%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
How much did Saudi Arabia give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €13m; 2023 €0.29bn; 2024 €46m; 2025 €8m; 2026 (to August) −€1m. In total since 2022: €0.36bn (likely <0.01% to 0.05%).
How does Saudi Arabia compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Kuwait +<0.01%, Qatar −0.02%, Iraq −0.22%, Saudi Arabia −0.30%, Jordan −0.35%, United Arab Emirates −0.71%, Oman −1.4%, Yemen −5.2%. In the map's ranking: number 27 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
Does Saudi Arabia have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Saudi Arabia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Saudi Arabia.
War Balance