Does Iran support Russia? What the money flows show
Iran's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Iran moved €1.9bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Iran kept more from selling to Russia, mostly weapons and troops sent to Russia (€1.8bn of €1.9bn)). The net is 0.44% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.21% to 0.69% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
likely 0.21% to 0.69% toward Russia · €1.9bn · ≈ 0.09%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.44% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€1m
likely from 0.02% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.44%
€1.9bn
likely 0.21% to 0.69% toward Russia very likely · >99%
Iran moved €1.9bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Iran kept more from selling to Russia, mostly weapons and troops sent to Russia (€1.8bn of €1.9bn)).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.01% of GDP less (€47m; likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.11% toward Ukraine)
Iran's own gain from trade with Russia: Iran kept 0.45% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1.9bn; likely 0.24% to 0.68% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Armed Russia: €3.5bn delivered Weapons, ammunition, drones or troops delivered to Russia: €3.5bn at full value. In the totals: €1.8bn, because what Russia paid for counts at the seller's own gain, like any sale.
Mostly one part Weapons and troops sent to Russia: €1.8bn of the net's €1.9bn.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €1m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€13m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€12m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.44% · €1.9bn
Weapons and troops sent to RussiaC
−0.44%
€1.8bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.02%
€85m
Russia kept more from weapons sold hereD
−0.02%
€65m
Iran earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.01%
€43m
Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loansD
+<0.01%
€40m
Iran kept more from selling to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€12m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−<0.01%
€11m
Iran's companies made more profit in RussiaD
−<0.01%
€7m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−<0.01%
€5m
Iran kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€2m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€2m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.80bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €1.2bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.1bn in 2025 (−9%). It sold €0.49bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.96bn in 2025 (+97%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 0.20% of what it bought from Russia. For Iran: €1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Iran's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Iran. Checked 27 October 2026.
31 sources back its parts: 7 official statistics, 7 research reports, 1 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 92% modelled (C) and 8% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (90%) counts
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Iran drones, with other military supplies sent to Russia since 2022: about €3.5bn at full value, from the sources on Russia's panel. In the totals, what Russia paid for counts at the seller's net gain, like a sale; what it did not pay for counts in full.
Does Iran support Russia?
In money terms the net is −0.44% of one year's GDP (likely 0.21% to 0.69% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Iran moved €1.9bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Iran kept more from selling to Russia, mostly weapons and troops sent to Russia (€1.8bn of €1.9bn)). Weapons and troops it sent to Russia (about €3.5bn at full value) are listed on Russia's panel; in the totals they count at the seller's gain. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Iran–Russia trade: how much since 2022?
It bought €1.1bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.2bn in 2021), and sold €0.96bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Iran moved €1.9bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Iran kept more from selling to Russia, mostly weapons and troops sent to Russia (€1.8bn of €1.9bn)).
How does Iran compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Iraq −0.22%, Iran −0.44%. In the map's ranking: number 23 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
We found no sanctions of Iran's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Iran.
War Balance