War Balance

Is Cameroon helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine

Cameroon's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€4m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €456m (1.0% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.99% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 3.1% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 94%).

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Leaning toward Ukraine by

0.99% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Ukraine · 94%

likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 3.1% toward Ukraine · €452m · ≈ 0.21%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.99% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 94%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

€4m

likely from 0.07% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by

1.0%

€456m

likely <0.01% to 3.1% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 94%

Russia kept €456m (1.0% of GDP) less than without the war.

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Its story in short

What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 94%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €4m

Ukraine kept less from sales hereC−<0.01%€4m

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 1.0% · €456m

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC+0.94%€430m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesC+0.07%€32m
Cameroon kept more from selling to RussiaC−<0.01%€3m
Cameroon kept more from shipping Russian oilD−<0.01%€3m
Cameroon kept more from services sold to RussiaC−<0.01%€1m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC+<0.01%€1m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€0.11bn.

YearSupport for UkraineTrade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)NetNet since 2022
2022+€2m+€112m+€114m+0.25%
2023−<€1m+€108m+€108m+0.49%
2024−€1m+€89m+€88m+0.68%
2025−€3m+€69m+€66m+0.83%
2026*−€1m+€78m+€76m+0.99%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Support for Ukraine by type

Cameroon's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

Military aid–
Private donations and purchases−€4m
Support for Ukraine (the map's figure)−€4m

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

Military aid to Ukraine, every country →

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.38bn from Russia in 2021 and €43m in 2025 (−89%). It sold €1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 28.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Cameroon: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Cameroon's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Cameroon. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €19m extra from 2022 (0.04% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

Neighbours by land

CountryNet, % of GDP
Cameroon+0.99%+€0.45bnlikely toward Ukraine · 94%
Nigeria+0.42%+€1.8bnvery likely · 96%
Congo+0.12%+€18mtoo close to call · 54% toward Ukraine
Gabon+0.08%+€16messentially zero
Central African Republic−4.8%−€0.12bnlikely toward Russia · 92%

In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

CountryNet, % of GDP
Rwanda+0.55%+€74mlikely toward Ukraine · 90%
Angola+0.25%+€0.26bnlikely toward Ukraine · 92%
Lebanon+2.8%+€0.58bnlikely toward Ukraine · 84%

How the number is backed

22 sources back its parts: 5 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 99% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).

Data coverage

Sources, by part

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries C

Ukraine kept less from sales here C

Cameroon kept more from selling to Russia C

Cameroon kept more from shipping Russian oil D

Every source of its parts (22)

Questions

Is Cameroon helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.99% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 3.1% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 94%). Chance toward Ukraine: 94%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €456m (1.0% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

How does Cameroon compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Cameroon +0.99%, Nigeria +0.42%, Congo +0.12%, Gabon +0.08%, Central African Republic −4.8%.

Where do the numbers for Cameroon come from?

22 sources back its parts, 5 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics; Ukraine kept less from sales here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

Does Cameroon have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Cameroon's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Cameroon.

Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Ukraine

  1. Turkmenistan+1.5%Leaning toward Ukraine · +€574m · 83%
  2. Greenland+1.5%Leaning toward Ukraine · +€46m · 67%
  3. Kosovo+1.1%Leaning toward Ukraine · +€106m · 91%
  4. Cameroon+0.99%Leaning toward Ukraine · +€452m · 94%
  5. Slovenia+0.66%Leaning toward Ukraine · +€417m · 88%
  6. Liberia+0.63%Leaning toward Ukraine · +€26m · 85%
  7. Bosnia and Herzegovina+0.56%Leaning toward Ukraine · +€142m · 85%

More about Cameroon

Every country, by year

22 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/cameroon/