Does Israel support Russia? The net is essentially zero

Q: Does Israel support Russia?

In money terms the net is +<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 50%; 64% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €138m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€453m; the other parts take €316m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

Q: Israel–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €0.36bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.56bn in 2021), and sold €0.42bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.14bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

Q: How much has Israel given to Ukraine?

Israel's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.14bn, 0.03% of one year's GDP (likely 0.01% to 0.08%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

Q: Does Israel still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 57.5% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €0.36bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €0.56bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

Q: Does Israel trade with Russia?

It bought €0.36bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.56bn in 2021), and sold €0.42bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €138m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€453m; the other parts take €316m off it).

Q: Why is Israel's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

Q: Does Israel have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Israel's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Israel.

Israel's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.14bn (0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €138m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€453m; the other parts take €316m off it). The net is <0.01% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

Open in the map →

Toward Ukraine by

<0.01% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine · €1m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = <0.01% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Toward Russia: mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere.

Chance toward Ukraine: 50%; 64% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.03%

€139m

likely 0.01% to 0.08% essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.03%

€138m

likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.10% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €138m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€453m; the other parts take €316m off it).

Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.03% of GDP more (€163m; likely from 0.13% toward Russia to 0.09% toward Ukraine)
Israel's own gain from trade with Russia: Israel kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€26m; likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.04% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Its story in short

Rough data: mostly estimates 64% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.

What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 50%; 64% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine.

What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.03% · €139m

Private donationsD	+0.02%	€102m
Hosting refugeesD	+<0.01%	€12m
Aid: weapons, money, loansC	+<0.01%	€12m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC	+<0.01%	€10m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC	+<0.01%	€8m
Israel kept part of others' aid, spent hereD	−<0.01%	€5m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.03% · €138m

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate	−0.09%	€453m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC	+0.05%	€267m
Its firms paid Russia less taxD	+<0.01%	€46m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC	−<0.01%	€46m
Israel earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD	−<0.01%	€35m
Israel's companies made less profit in RussiaD	+<0.01%	€33m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC	+<0.01%	€23m
Israel kept less from services sold to RussiaC	+<0.01%	€15m
Israel kept less from selling to RussiaC	+<0.01%	€12m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.56bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €87m in 2022 to €10m in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

Year	Support for Ukraine	Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)	Net	Net since 2022
2022	+€87m	+€28m	+€115m	+0.02%
2023	+€23m	−€581m	−€558m	−0.09%
2024	+€10m	+€173m	+€183m	−0.05%
2025	+€10m	+€116m	+€126m	−0.03%
2026*	+€9m	+€126m	+€135m	+<0.01%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Support for Ukraine by type

Israel's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

Military aid	–
Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share)	€8mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €8m
Humanitarian aid	€12m
Refugee hosting	€13m
Private donations and purchases	€0.11bn
Money flowing back	−€5msubtracted
Support for Ukraine (the map's figure)	€0.14bn

Quality of the split: C No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

Military aid to Ukraine, every country →

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.56bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.36bn in 2025 (−36%). It sold €0.67bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.42bn in 2025 (−37%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 57.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Israel: €46m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Israel's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

Fuel	Customs (CIF)	Map basis (FOB)	Tracker (CREA)	Quality
Crude oil	€0.24bn	€0.14bnrange €95m to €0.20bn	€0.21bn	C (estimate)
Oil products	€0.50bn	€0.40bnrange €0.26bn to €0.54bn	€1.8bn	C (estimate)
Coal	€0.14bn	€0.12bnrange €72m to €0.16bn	€0.55bn	B
Other goods	€2.8bn	€2.5bn	–
All goods	€3.7bn	€3.2bn	–

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: B, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

Every buyer, by fuel →

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Israel's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Israel. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.18bn extra from 2022 (0.04% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.17bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

Money flowing back from the war effort

€0.17bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Israel; what its firms kept of it, €5m, is taken off its support.

Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russia took €112m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €28m to €366m; 0.02% of a year's GDP.

Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.45bn (0.09% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €152m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €120m to €283m); €39m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

Neighbours by land

Country	Net, % of GDP
Lebanon	+2.8%+€0.58bnlikely toward Ukraine · 84%
Palestine	+0.09%+€15messentially zero
Israel	+<0.01%+€1messentially zero
Jordan	−0.35%−€0.18bnvery likely · 97%
Egypt	−0.43%−€1.7bnlikely toward Russia · 95%
Syria	−1.0%−€0.20bntoo close to call · 64% toward Russia

How the number is backed

33 sources back its parts: 11 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 36% modelled (C) and 64% rough indications (D).

Data coverage

Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

Sources, by part

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

Private donations D

research Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere

Its firms paid Russia less tax D

research Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings

Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

Every source of its parts (33)

Questions