War Balance
Is Kuwait helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
Kuwait's support for Ukraine since 2022: €7m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €6m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€20m; the other parts take €14m off it). The net is <0.01% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.17% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Ukraine by
<0.01% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.17% toward Ukraine · €1m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = <0.01% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Toward Russia: mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere.
Chance toward Russia: 51%; 10% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
€7m
likely from 0.01% below zero to 0.03% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
<0.01%
€6m
likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.16% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €6m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€20m; the other parts take €14m off it).
- Russia's gain: Russia kept <0.01% of GDP more (€4m; likely from 0.07% toward Russia to 0.16% toward Ukraine)
- Kuwait's own gain from trade with Russia: Kuwait kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€2m; likely from 0.06% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 51%; 10% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Kuwait kept less from shipping Russian oil. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.17% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €7m
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €6m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +<0.01% | €3m |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Kuwait kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €1m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by <0.01% · €6m
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +0.02% | €31m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.01% | €20m |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −<0.01% | €14m |
| Kuwait kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€18m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€4m | −€15m | −€11m | −<0.01% |
| 2023 | +€2m | +€3m | +€5m | −<0.01% |
| 2024 | +€2m | −€20m | −€18m | −0.02% |
| 2025 | −€1m | +€11m | +€10m | −<0.01% |
| 2026* | +<€1m | +€15m | +€15m | +<0.01% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Support for Ukraine by type
Kuwait's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €6mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €6m |
| Humanitarian aid | €3m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€1m |
| Money flowing back | −€1msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €7m |
Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €69m from Russia in 2021 and €39m in 2025 (−43%). It sold €1m to Russia in 2021 and €4m in 2025. For Kuwait: €31m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Kuwait's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil products | €0.13bn | €53mrange €37m to €71m | €0.10bn | C (estimate) |
| LNG | €0.25bn | €0.18bnrange €0.13bn to €0.24bn | €0.25bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0m | €0m | €5m | – |
| Other goods | €0m | €85m | – | |
| All goods | €0.38bn | €0.32bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Kuwait's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kuwait. Checked 27 October 2026.
The cost of switching away from Russian energy
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €33m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€59m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Kuwait; what its firms kept of it, €1m, is taken off its support.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
Neighbours by land
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Kuwait | +<0.01%+€1messentially zero |
| Iraq | −0.22%−€0.57bnvery likely · 96% |
| Saudi Arabia | −0.30%−€3.5bnvery likely · 99% |
How the number is backed
19 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 11 method inputs. By size, 4% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 71% modelled (C) and 25% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Sources, by part
Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices C
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C
Its share of IMF and World Bank loans C
Aid: weapons, money, loans B
Every source of its parts (19)
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
- method input Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates
- own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- method input net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results
- method input refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins
- research Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding
- official Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports
- official Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia
- method input Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)
- method input Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums
- method input Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)
- method input Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute
- own estimate Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates
Questions
Why is Kuwait's net so small?
Its net is essentially zero: +<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.17% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Kuwait kept less from shipping Russian oil.
Is Kuwait helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.17% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 51%; 10% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €6m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€20m; the other parts take €14m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How much has Kuwait given to Ukraine?
Almost nothing that can be measured: €7m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).
How does Kuwait compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Kuwait +<0.01%, Iraq −0.22%, Saudi Arabia −0.30%.
Where do the numbers for Kuwait come from?
19 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Does Kuwait have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Kuwait's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kuwait.
Nearby in the ranking
Essentially zero
- French Polynesia+<0.01%Essentially zero · +<€1m · 95%
- Ethiopia+<0.01%Essentially zero · +€6m · 51%
- Andorra+<0.01%Essentially zero · +<€1m · 53%
- Kuwait+<0.01%Essentially zero · +€1m · 51%
- Israel+<0.01%Essentially zero · +€1m · 50%
- Guyana−<0.01%Essentially zero · −<€1m · 68%
- Bermuda−<0.01%Essentially zero · −<€1m · 53%
More about Kuwait
Groups
Its parts, ranked against other countries
- Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine
- Government aid to Ukraine
- Purchases from Ukraine vs no war
- Extra sales to Ukraine
Every country, by year
19 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/kuwait/