Is Ethiopia helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Q: Why is Ethiopia's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.13% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Ukraine kept less from sales here.

Q: Is Ethiopia helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.13% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 51%; 20% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €46m (0.04% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

Q: How does Ethiopia compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Ethiopia +<0.01%, Sudan −0.21%, Kenya −0.31%, Eritrea −0.32%, Djibouti −1.6%.

Q: Where do the numbers for Ethiopia come from?

21 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Ukraine kept less from sales here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

Q: Does Ethiopia have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Ethiopia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Ethiopia.

Ethiopia's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€40m (−0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €46m (0.04% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is <0.01% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.13% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

Open in the map →

Toward Ukraine by

<0.01% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.13% toward Ukraine · €6m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = <0.01% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Russia: 51%; 20% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.03%

€40m

likely <0.01% to 0.13% below zero very likely · 97%

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.04%

€46m

likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.15% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €46m (0.04% of GDP) less than without the war.

Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.04% of GDP less (€48m; likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.16% toward Ukraine)
Ethiopia's own gain from trade with Russia: Ethiopia kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Its story in short

Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 51%; 20% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Ukraine kept less from sales here. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.13% toward Ukraine.

What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.03% · €40m

Ukraine kept less from sales hereC

−0.03%

€40m

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.04% · €46m

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC	+0.06%	€79m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate	−0.02%	€22m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC	−<0.01%	€6m
Russia kept more from weapons sold hereD	−<0.01%	€4m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC	+<0.01%	€1m
Ethiopia kept more from selling to RussiaC	−<0.01%	€1m
Ethiopia kept more from services sold to RussiaC	−<0.01%	€1m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€21m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

Year	Support for Ukraine	Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)	Net	Net since 2022
2022	−€3m	+€24m	+€21m	+0.02%
2023	−€5m	+€16m	+€11m	+0.03%
2024	−€11m	+€2m	−€9m	+0.02%
2025	−€13m	+€2m	−€11m	+<0.01%
2026*	−€8m	+€2m	−€5m	+<0.01%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Support for Ukraine by type

Ethiopia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

Military aid	–
Private donations and purchases	−€40m
Support for Ukraine (the map's figure)	−€40m

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

Military aid to Ukraine, every country →

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.16bn from Russia in 2021 and €12m in 2025 (−92%). It sold €17m to Russia in 2021 and €25m in 2025 (+47%). For Ethiopia: €6m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Ethiopia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Ethiopia. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

Money flowing back from the war effort

€12m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Ethiopia; what its firms kept of it, <€1m, is taken off its support.

Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

Neighbours by land

Country	Net, % of GDP
Ethiopia	+<0.01%+€6messentially zero
Sudan	−0.21%−€94mtoo close to call · 54% toward Russia
Kenya	−0.31%−€0.33bnlikely toward Russia · 90%
Eritrea	−0.32%−€7mlikely toward Russia · 68%
Djibouti	−1.6%−€59mlikely toward Russia · 89%

How the number is backed

21 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 83% modelled (C) and 17% rough indications (D).

Data coverage

Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

Sources, by part

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

Ukraine kept less from sales here C

own estimate Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it

Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

Russia kept more from weapons sold here D

research Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)

Every source of its parts (21)

Questions

Why is Ethiopia's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.13% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Ukraine kept less from sales here.