War Balance
Syria's support for Ukraine since 2022: €4m (0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €204m (1.0% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 1.0% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 5.0% toward Russia to 5.4% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 64% toward Russia).
Toward Russia by
1.0% of a year's GDP since 2022
too close to call · 64% toward Russia
likely from 5.0% toward Russia to 5.4% toward Ukraine · €200m · ≈ 0.22%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 1.0% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more fuel bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 64%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.02%
€4m
likely <0.01% to 0.04% essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
1.0%
€204m
likely from 5.1% toward Russia to 5.4% toward Ukraine too close to call · 64% toward Russia
Russia kept €204m (1.0% of GDP) more than without the war.
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 64%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
Supported Ukraine with 0.02% · €4m
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.02% | €4m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 1.0% · €204m
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.56% | €110m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.47% | €94m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: −€0.12bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +<€1m | +€7m | +€7m | +0.04% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | +€40m | +€40m | +0.24% |
| 2024 | +<€1m | +€2m | +€2m | +0.25% |
| 2025 | +€2m | −€124m | −€121m | −0.36% |
| 2026* | +€1m | −€130m | −€128m | −1.0% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Syria's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | €4m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €4m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €0.36bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.70bn in 2025 (+95%). It sold €8m to Russia in 2021 and €4m in 2025. For Syria: €94m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Syria's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crude oil | €1.8bn | €0.85bnrange €0.29bn to €1.6bn | €1.5bn | C (estimate) |
| Oil products | €1bn | €0.55bnrange €0.19bn to €1bn | €0.91bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €27m | €16mrange €5m to €30m | €28m | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €0m | €0.90bn | – | |
| All goods | €2.8bn | €2.3bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: A, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Syria's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Syria. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.36bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Its direction is too close to call, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Lebanon | +2.8%+€0.58bnlikely toward Ukraine · 84% |
| Israel | +<0.01%+€1messentially zero |
| Iraq | −0.22%−€0.57bnvery likely · 96% |
| Jordan | −0.35%−€0.18bnvery likely · 97% |
| Syria | −1.0%−€0.20bntoo close to call · 64% toward Russia |
18 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 99% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −1.0% of one year's GDP (likely from 5.0% toward Russia to 5.4% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 64% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 64%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €204m (1.0% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
It bought €0.70bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.36bn in 2021), and sold €4m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €204m (1.0% of GDP) more than without the war.
Syria's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €4m, 0.02% of one year's GDP (likely <0.01% to 0.04%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Lebanon +2.8%, Israel +<0.01%, Iraq −0.22%, Jordan −0.35%, Syria −1.0%.
18 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Ukraine kept more from extra sales here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Syria's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Syria.
Too close to call
18 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/syria/