Is Palestine helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Q: Is Palestine helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.09% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 57%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €19m (0.12% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

Q: Why is Palestine's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.09% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

Q: How does Palestine compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Palestine +0.09%, Israel +<0.01%, Jordan −0.35%, Egypt −0.43%.

Q: Where do the numbers for Palestine come from?

14 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Ukraine kept less from sales here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

Q: Does Palestine have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Palestine's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Palestine.

Palestine's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€5m (−0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €19m (0.12% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.09% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

Open in the map →

Toward Ukraine by

0.09% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine · €15m · ≈ 0.02%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.09% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 57%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.03%

€5m

likely from 0.26% below zero to 0.03% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.12%

€19m

likely from 0.34% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine too close to call · 64% toward Ukraine

Russia kept €19m (0.12% of GDP) less than without the war.

Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.12% of GDP less (€19m; likely from 0.34% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine)
Palestine's own gain from trade with Russia: Palestine kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Its story in short

Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 57%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine.

What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.03% · €5m

Ukraine kept less from sales hereC

−0.03%

€5m

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.12% · €19m

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC	+0.19%	€32m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC	−0.06%	€10m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate	−0.01%	€2m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€6m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

Year	Support for Ukraine	Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)	Net	Net since 2022
2022	−€1m	−€5m	−€6m	−0.03%
2023	−€1m	+€5m	+€4m	−0.01%
2024	−€1m	+€5m	+€4m	+0.02%
2025	−€1m	+€4m	+€3m	+0.03%
2026*	−€1m	+€10m	+€10m	+0.09%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Support for Ukraine by type

Palestine's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

Military aid	–
Private donations and purchases	−€5m
Support for Ukraine (the map's figure)	−€5m

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

Military aid to Ukraine, every country →

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €30m from Russia in 2021 and €40m in 2025 (+33%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For Palestine: €10m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Palestine's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Palestine. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

Neighbours by land

Country	Net, % of GDP
Palestine	+0.09%+€15messentially zero
Israel	+<0.01%+€1messentially zero
Jordan	−0.35%−€0.18bnvery likely · 97%
Egypt	−0.43%−€1.7bnlikely toward Russia · 95%

How the number is backed

14 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 96% modelled (C) and 4% rough indications (D).

Data coverage

Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

Sources, by part

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

Ukraine kept less from sales here C

own estimate Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it

Every source of its parts (14)

Questions