Is Niger helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Q: Is Niger helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.17% toward Russia to 0.40% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 58%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€5m; the other parts take €3m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

Q: Why is Niger's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: −<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.17% toward Russia to 0.40% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

Q: How does Niger compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Nigeria +0.42%, Mali +0.06%, Algeria +0.02%, Niger −<0.01%, Benin −0.36%, Burkina Faso −3.9%, Libya −6.6%.

Q: Where do the numbers for Niger come from?

14 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps): Wagner Group / Africa Corps: RUSI (2025), The Sentry, Blood Gold Report, UN Panels of Experts, US Treasury, EU and UK sanctions designations. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

Q: Does Niger have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Niger's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Niger.

Niger's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€5m; the other parts take €3m off it). The net is <0.01% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.17% toward Russia to 0.40% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

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Toward Russia by

<0.01% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.17% toward Russia to 0.40% toward Ukraine · €2m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = <0.01% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 58%; 90% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

<0.01%

€1m

likely from 0.17% toward Russia to 0.40% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €1m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€5m; the other parts take €3m off it).

Russia's gain: Russia kept <0.01% of GDP more (€1m; likely from 0.17% toward Russia to 0.40% toward Ukraine)
Niger's own gain from trade with Russia: Niger kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Its story in short

Russian forces in the country Wagner Group or Russia's Africa Corps operated here: 2024, 2025, 2026. Paid to them and taken by their firms, at Russia's gain, against 2021: €3m.

What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 58%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.17% toward Russia to 0.40% toward Ukraine.

What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by <0.01% · €1m

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC	+0.06%	€10m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate	−0.03%	€5m
Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps)D	−0.02%	€3m
Russia kept more from weapons sold hereD	−0.01%	€2m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC	−0.01%	€2m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€2m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

Year	Support for Ukraine	Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)	Net	Net since 2022
2022	+<€1m	−€1m	−€1m	−<0.01%
2023	−<€1m	−€2m	−€2m	−0.02%
2024	−<€1m	+€1m	+€1m	−0.02%
2025	−<€1m	−<€1m	−<€1m	−0.02%
2026*	−<€1m	+€1m	+€1m	−<0.01%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €8m from Russia in 2021 and €3m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. For Niger: €2m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Niger's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Niger. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

Neighbours by land

Country	Net, % of GDP
Nigeria	+0.42%+€1.8bnvery likely · 96%
Mali	+0.06%+€14messentially zero
Algeria	+0.02%+€36messentially zero
Niger	−<0.01%−€2messentially zero
Benin	−0.36%−€65mtoo close to call · 56% toward Russia
Burkina Faso	−3.9%−€0.75bnlikely toward Russia · 92%
Libya	−6.6%−€2.8bnvery likely · 99%

How the number is backed

14 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 55% modelled (C) and 45% rough indications (D).

Data coverage

Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (90%) counts
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

Sources, by part

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

Every source of its parts (14)

Questions