Is Egypt helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia
Egypt's support for Ukraine since 2022: €86m (0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.8bn (0.45% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.43% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 1.1% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 95%).
likely from 1.1% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine · €1.7bn · ≈ 0.09%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.43% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.02%
€86m
likely from 0.10% below zero to 0.07% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.45%
€1.8bn
likely 0.01% to 1.1% toward Russia very likely · 95%
Russia kept €1.8bn (0.45% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.42% of GDP more (€1.7bn; likely from 1.0% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine)
Egypt's own gain from trade with Russia: Egypt kept 0.03% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€102m; likely <0.01% to 0.10% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €471m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 52% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €2.8bn in 2021, €4.2bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 311% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €418m in 2021, €1.7bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €1.5bn of the net's €1.7bn.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. No part flips it by shrinking; Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices would have to be 277% larger.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.02% · €86m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.02%
€79m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€7m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.45% · €1.8bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−0.37%
€1.5bn
Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC
+0.15%
€605m
Russia kept more from its nuclear projects and loansC
−0.13%
€506m
Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD
−0.06%
€221m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.05%
€209m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD
+0.03%
€133m
Egypt kept more from selling to RussiaC
−0.01%
€58m
Egypt earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.01%
€52m
Egypt kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€9m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€5m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−<0.01%
€1m
Egypt kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.51bn.
It bought €2.8bn from Russia in 2021 and €4.2bn in 2025 (+52%). It sold €0.42bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.7bn in 2025 (+311%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 7.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Egypt: €605m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2026, 8% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Egypt's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€1.9bn
€1.3bnrange €0.91bn to €1.9bn
€1.1bn
C (estimate)
Oil products
€0.81bn
€0.71bnrange €0.50bn to €0.95bn
€8.6bn
C (estimate)
Coal
€0.27bn
€0.24bnrange €0.17bn to €0.32bn
€0.63bn
C (estimate)
Other goods
€20.6bn
€18.7bn
–
All goods
€23.6bn
€21bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Egypt's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Egypt. Checked 27 October 2026.
30 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 82% modelled (C) and 18% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −0.43% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.1% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 95%). Chance toward Russia: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.8bn (0.45% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Egypt trade with Russia?
It bought €4.2bn from Russia in 2025 (€2.8bn in 2021), and sold €1.7bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.8bn (0.45% of GDP) more than without the war.
How much has Egypt given to Ukraine?
Egypt's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €86m, 0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.10% below zero to 0.07% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
What decides Egypt's number?
Chance toward Russia: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. No part flips it by shrinking; Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices would have to be 277% larger.
How does Egypt compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Palestine +0.09%, Israel +<0.01%, Sudan −0.21%, Egypt −0.43%, Libya −6.6%.
We found no sanctions of Egypt's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Egypt.
War Balance