War Balance
Papua New Guinea's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €22m (0.08% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€24m; the other parts take €2m off it). The net is 0.08% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.03% to 0.13% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
Toward Russia by
0.08% of a year's GDP since 2022
very likely · >99%
likely 0.03% to 0.13% toward Russia · €22m · ≈ 0.02%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.08% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.08%
€22m
likely 0.03% to 0.13% toward Russia very likely · >99%
Russia kept €22m (0.08% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€24m; the other parts take €2m off it).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.08% · €22m
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesC | −0.08% | €24m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +<0.01% | €2m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€7m.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −<0.01% |
| 2023 | +<€1m | −€4m | −€4m | −0.02% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | −€7m | −€7m | −0.04% |
| 2025 | −<€1m | −€4m | −€4m | −0.05% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | −€7m | −€7m | −0.08% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold €3m to Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025. For Papua New Guinea: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Papua New Guinea's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Papua New Guinea. Checked 27 October 2026.
In the map's ranking: number 32 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Papua New Guinea | −0.08%−€22mvery likely · >99% |
| Indonesia | −0.20%−€2.6bnvery likely · >99% |
10 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −0.08% of one year's GDP (likely 0.03% to 0.13% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €22m (0.08% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€24m; the other parts take €2m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Papua New Guinea −0.08%, Indonesia −0.20%. In the map's ranking: number 32 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
10 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Papua New Guinea's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Papua New Guinea.
Toward Russia · number 32 of 32
10 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/papua-new-guinea/