Is the Central African Republic helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia
The Central African Republic's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €116m (4.8% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly payments and resources to Russian forces (Wagner / Africa Corps) (€106m of €116m). The net is 4.8% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 13.8% toward Russia to 0.79% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 92%).
likely from 13.8% toward Russia to 0.79% toward Ukraine · €115m · ≈ 1.0%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 4.8% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps)).
Chance toward Russia: 92%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
likely from 0.02% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
4.8%
€116m
likely from 13.8% toward Russia to 0.78% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 92%
Russia kept €116m (4.8% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly payments and resources to Russian forces (Wagner / Africa Corps) (€106m of €116m).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 4.8% of GDP more (€116m; likely from 13.8% toward Russia to 0.78% toward Ukraine)
The Central African Republic's own gain from trade with Russia: The Central African Republic kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian forces in the country Wagner Group or Russia's Africa Corps operated here: 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026. Paid to them and taken by their firms, at Russia's gain, against 2021: €106m.
Rough data: mostly estimates 99% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
Mostly one part Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps): €106m of the net's €115m.
Small economy A small economy (GDP €2.4bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 92%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps).
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 4.8% · €116m
Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps)D
−4.4%
€106m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.26%
€6m
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereD
−0.15%
€4m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€38m.
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €1m from Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For the Central African Republic: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of the Central African Republic's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Central African Republic. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €6m (0.26% of one year's GDP).
How the number is backed
11 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 0% modelled (C) and 100% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (30%) counts
Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found
Sources, by part
Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps) D
In money terms the net is −4.8% of one year's GDP (likely from 13.8% toward Russia to 0.79% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 92%). Chance toward Russia: 92%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €116m (4.8% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly payments and resources to Russian forces (Wagner / Africa Corps) (€106m of €116m). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Where do the numbers for the Central African Republic come from?
Does the Central African Republic have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of the Central African Republic's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Central African Republic.
War Balance