War Balance
Mali's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€3m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €16m (0.07% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.06% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.44% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Ukraine by
0.06% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.44% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine · €14m · ≈ 0.01%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.06% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 57%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.01%
€3m
likely from 0.09% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.07%
€16m
likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €16m (0.07% of GDP) less than without the war.
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Ukraine: 57%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps). Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.44% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · €3m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.01% | €3m |
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.07% · €16m
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.16% | €36m |
| Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps)D | −0.04% | €10m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.04% | €8m |
| Russia kept more from weapons sold hereD | −0.02% | €4m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€12m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | +€12m | +€12m | +0.05% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | +€1m | +€1m | +0.06% |
| 2024 | −€1m | −€3m | −€3m | +0.04% |
| 2025 | −€1m | +€1m | −<€1m | +0.04% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | +€5m | +€4m | +0.06% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Mali's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | −€3m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€3m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €55m from Russia in 2021 and €26m in 2025 (−53%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For Mali: €8m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Mali's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Mali. Checked 27 October 2026.
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Mali | +0.06%+€14messentially zero |
| Algeria | +0.02%+€36messentially zero |
| Niger | −<0.01%−€2messentially zero |
| Mauritania | −0.12%−€12mlikely toward Russia · 68% |
| Côte d'Ivoire | −0.71%−€0.52bnvery likely · >99% |
| Senegal | −2.1%−€0.60bnlikely toward Russia · 76% |
| Burkina Faso | −3.9%−€0.75bnlikely toward Russia · 92% |
18 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 75% modelled (C) and 25% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is +0.06% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.44% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 57%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €16m (0.07% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Its net is essentially zero: +0.06% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.44% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps).
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Mali +0.06%, Algeria +0.02%, Niger −<0.01%, Mauritania −0.12%, Côte d'Ivoire −0.71%, Senegal −2.1%, Burkina Faso −3.9%.
18 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps): Wagner Group / Africa Corps: RUSI (2025), The Sentry, Blood Gold Report, UN Panels of Experts, US Treasury, EU and UK sanctions designations; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Mali's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Mali.
Essentially zero
18 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/mali/