War Balance

Is the Solomon Islands helping Russia? What the money flows show

The Solomon Islands' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €4m (0.27% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€4m of €4m). The net is 0.27% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.07% to 0.43% toward Russia; very likely · 98%).

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Toward Russia by

0.27% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 98%

likely 0.07% to 0.43% toward Russia · €4m · ≈ 0.06%/yr

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.27% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 98%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.27%

€4m

likely 0.07% to 0.43% toward Russia very likely · 98%

Russia kept €4m (0.27% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€4m of €4m).

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Its story in short

What makes up the number

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by <0.01% · <€1m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.27% · €4m

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesC−0.27%€4m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€1m.

YearSupport for UkraineTrade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)NetNet since 2022
2022€0−€1m−€1m−0.05%
2023€0−<€1m−<€1m−0.08%
2024€0−€1m−€1m−0.15%
2025€0−€1m−€1m−0.20%
2026*−<€1m−€1m−€1m−0.27%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of the Solomon Islands' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Solomon Islands. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €4m (0.27% of one year's GDP).

How the number is backed

4 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 0 of this project's own estimates, plus 2 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D). No data: Purchases from Ukraine · Fuel and goods bought from Russia · Sales to Russia · War-time fuel prices. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

Data coverage

Sources, by part

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries C

Every source of its parts (4)

Questions

Is the Solomon Islands helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.27% of one year's GDP (likely 0.07% to 0.43% toward Russia; very likely · 98%). Chance toward Russia: 98%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €4m (0.27% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€4m of €4m). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

Where do the numbers for the Solomon Islands come from?

4 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

Does the Solomon Islands have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of the Solomon Islands' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Solomon Islands.

Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia

  1. Nauru−0.19%Toward Russia · −<€1m
  2. 29.Indonesia−0.20%Toward Russia · −€2.6bn
  3. 28.Iraq−0.22%Toward Russia · −€568m
  4. Solomon Islands−0.27%Toward Russia · −€4m
  5. Samoa−0.29%Toward Russia · −€3m
  6. 27.Saudi Arabia−0.30%Toward Russia · −€3.5bn
  7. Tonga−0.31%Toward Russia · −€2m

More about Solomon Islands

Every country, by year

4 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/solomon-islands/