Is Sierra Leone helping Russia? What the money flows show
Sierra Leone's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€1m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Sierra Leone moved €8m (0.13% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Sierra Leone kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€6m of €8m)). The net is 0.14% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.08% to 0.30% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
likely 0.08% to 0.30% toward Russia · €9m · ≈ 0.03%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.14% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.01%
€1m
likely from 0.11% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.13%
€8m
likely 0.07% to 0.24% toward Russia very likely · >99%
Sierra Leone moved €8m (0.13% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Sierra Leone kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€6m of €8m)).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.10% of GDP more (€6m; likely 0.04% to 0.18% toward Russia)
Sierra Leone's own gain from trade with Russia: Sierra Leone kept 0.03% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€2m; likely <0.01% to 0.12% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €14m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
Rough data: mostly estimates 91% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · €1m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−0.01%
€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.13% · €8m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.10%
€6m
Sierra Leone kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−0.03%
€2m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: −€2m.
It bought €2m from Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Sierra Leone's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Sierra Leone. Checked 27 October 2026.
14 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 10 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 8% modelled (C) and 92% rough indications (D). No data: Fuel and goods bought from Russia · Sales to Russia · War-time fuel prices. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found
Sources, by part
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
In money terms the net is −0.14% of one year's GDP (likely 0.08% to 0.30% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Sierra Leone moved €8m (0.13% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Sierra Leone kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€6m of €8m)). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How does Sierra Leone compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Liberia +0.63%, Sierra Leone −0.14%. In the map's ranking: number 30 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
We found no sanctions of Sierra Leone's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Sierra Leone.
War Balance