War Balance
Iraq's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€57m (−0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €511m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€566m; the other parts take €55m off it). The net is 0.22% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely <0.01% to 0.59% toward Russia; very likely · 96%).
Toward Russia by
0.22% of a year's GDP since 2022
very likely · 96%
likely <0.01% to 0.59% toward Russia · €568m · ≈ 0.05%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.22% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: 96%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.02%
€57m
likely from 0.11% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.20%
€511m
likely from 0.56% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 94%
Russia kept €511m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€566m; the other parts take €55m off it).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.02% · €57m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.02% | €62m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €4m |
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.20% · €511m
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.22% | €566m |
| Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loansB | +0.14% | €372m |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.13% | €328m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.01% | €28m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +0.01% | €28m |
| Russian owners kept less from their firms hereC | +<0.01% | €18m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €4m |
| Iraq kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €2m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.29bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −€21m | −€265m | −€286m | −0.11% |
| 2023 | −€7m | −€206m | −€213m | −0.19% |
| 2024 | −€13m | −€42m | −€55m | −0.21% |
| 2025 | −€8m | −€28m | −€37m | −0.23% |
| 2026* | −€8m | +€31m | +€22m | −0.22% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Iraq's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €4mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €4m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€62m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€57m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €12m from Russia in 2021 and €0.32bn in 2025 (+2620%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 5.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Iraq: €28m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Iraq's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil products | €0.11bn | €0.44bnrange €0.12bn to €0.91bn | €0.14bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €1.3bn | €0.90bn | – | |
| All goods | €1.4bn | €1.3bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Iraq's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Iraq. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €22m extra from 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.57bn (0.22% of one year's GDP).
In the map's ranking: number 28 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Kuwait | +<0.01%+€1messentially zero |
| Iraq | −0.22%−€0.57bnvery likely · 96% |
| Saudi Arabia | −0.30%−€3.5bnvery likely · 99% |
| Jordan | −0.35%−€0.18bnvery likely · 97% |
| Iran | −0.44%−€1.9bnvery likely · >99% |
| Syria | −1.0%−€0.20bntoo close to call · 64% toward Russia |
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Sierra Leone | −0.14%−€9mvery likely · >99% |
| Saudi Arabia | −0.30%−€3.5bnvery likely · 99% |
| Jordan | −0.35%−€0.18bnvery likely · 97% |
| Iran | −0.44%−€1.9bnvery likely · >99% |
24 sources back its parts: 4 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 11 method inputs. By size, 26% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 32% modelled (C) and 42% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −0.22% of one year's GDP (likely <0.01% to 0.59% toward Russia; very likely · 96%). Chance toward Russia: 96%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €511m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€566m; the other parts take €55m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
It bought €0.32bn from Russia in 2025 (€12m in 2021). What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €511m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€566m; the other parts take €55m off it).
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Kuwait +<0.01%, Iraq −0.22%, Saudi Arabia −0.30%, Jordan −0.35%, Iran −0.44%, Syria −1.0%. In the map's ranking: number 28 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
24 sources back its parts, 4 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loans: Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting; Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Iraq's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Iraq.
Toward Russia · number 28 of 32
24 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/iraq/