War Balance
Is Qatar helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
Qatar's support for Ukraine since 2022: €56m (0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €88m (0.04% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.02% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.11% toward Russia to 0.12% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Russia by
0.02% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.11% toward Russia to 0.12% toward Ukraine · €32m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.02% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly gold).
Chance toward Russia: 60%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.03%
€56m
likely <0.01% to 0.05% essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.04%
€88m
likely from 0.13% toward Russia to 0.09% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €88m (0.04% of GDP) more than without the war.
- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.04% of GDP more (€82m; likely from 0.13% toward Russia to 0.09% toward Ukraine)
- Qatar's own gain from trade with Russia: Qatar kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€6m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to <0.01% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 60%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.11% toward Russia to 0.12% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.03% · €56m
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.03% | €61m |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €6m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Qatar kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €2m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.04% · €88m
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.02% | €46m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.01% | €31m |
| Qatar kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €6m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €3m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: −€23m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€3m | −€16m | −€13m | −<0.01% |
| 2023 | +€9m | +€2m | +€11m | −<0.01% |
| 2024 | +€13m | −€20m | −€8m | −<0.01% |
| 2025 | +€17m | −€41m | −€23m | −0.02% |
| 2026* | +€15m | −€13m | +€1m | −0.02% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Support for Ukraine by type
Qatar's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €2mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €2m |
| Humanitarian aid | €61m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€6m |
| Money flowing back | −€2msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €56m |
Quality of the split: B No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €0.22bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.20bn in 2025 (−10%). It sold €7m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 3.3% of what it bought from Russia. For Qatar: €1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Qatar's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Qatar. Checked 27 October 2026.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
Neighbours by land
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Qatar | −0.02%−€32messentially zero |
| Saudi Arabia | −0.30%−€3.5bnvery likely · 99% |
How the number is backed
22 sources back its parts: 5 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 11 method inputs. By size, 39% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 40% modelled (C) and 21% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Sources, by part
Aid: weapons, money, loans B
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- official Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
Qatar kept more from services sold to Russia C
Ukraine kept less from sales here C
Every source of its parts (22)
- official Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- official Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
- method input net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results
- method input refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins
- own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it
- official Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia
- method input Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)
- method input Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums
- method input Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)
- method input Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute
- own estimate Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates
- research Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding
- official Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop_its6_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad
- research Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings
- method input Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
Questions
Is Qatar helping Russia?
In money terms the net is −0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.11% toward Russia to 0.12% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 60%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €88m (0.04% of GDP) more than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How much has Qatar given to Ukraine?
Qatar's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €56m, 0.03% of one year's GDP (likely <0.01% to 0.05%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Why is Qatar's net so small?
Its net is essentially zero: −0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.11% toward Russia to 0.12% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
Does Qatar trade with Russia?
It bought €0.20bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.22bn in 2021). What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €88m (0.04% of GDP) more than without the war.
How does Qatar compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Qatar −0.02%, Saudi Arabia −0.30%.
Where do the numbers for Qatar come from?
22 sources back its parts, 5 of them official statistics. By part: Aid: weapons, money, loans: Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports; Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Does Qatar have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Qatar's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Qatar.
Nearby in the ranking
Essentially zero
- Niger−<0.01%Essentially zero · −€2m · 58%
- Bangladesh−0.01%Essentially zero · −€61m · 55%
- Nicaragua−0.01%Essentially zero · −€2m · 50%
- Qatar−0.02%Essentially zero · −€32m · 60%
- Bahrain−0.02%Essentially zero · −€8m · 53%
- Cayman Islands−0.02%Essentially zero · −€2m · 56%
- Malawi−0.02%Essentially zero · −€3m · 50%
More about Qatar
Groups
Its parts, ranked against other countries
- Government aid to Ukraine
- Services sold to Russia
- Services bought from Russia
- Extra services sold to Ukraine
Every country, by year
22 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/qatar/