War Balance
Singapore's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.12bn (0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Singapore moved €2.2bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Singapore kept more from selling to Russia). The net is 0.41% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 1.5% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 75%).
Leaning toward Russia by
0.41% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Russia · 75%
likely from 1.5% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine · €2.0bn · ≈ 0.09%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.41% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Russia: 75%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.02%
€119m
likely 0.01% to 0.08% essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.44%
€2.2bn
likely from 1.6% toward Russia to 0.71% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 78%
Singapore moved €2.2bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Singapore kept more from selling to Russia).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% of GDP in returns (€46m).
Chance toward Russia: 75%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
Supported Ukraine with 0.02% · €119m
| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €107m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €11m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +<0.01% | €2m |
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.44% · €2.2bn
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.19% | €932m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.14% | €690m |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.07% | €332m |
| Singapore kept more from shipping Russian oilC | −0.05% | €264m |
| Singapore kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €19m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €18m |
| Singapore's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +<0.01% | €15m |
| Singapore kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €15m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% in returns · €46m
| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyD | +<0.01% | €46m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€1.4bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €82m in 2022 to €7m in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€82m | +€830m | +€5m | +€916m | +0.18% |
| 2023 | +€14m | −€631m | +€13m | −€604m | +0.06% |
| 2024 | +€11m | −€1.5bn | +€13m | −€1.4bn | −0.23% |
| 2025 | +€7m | −€432m | +€10m | −€415m | −0.31% |
| 2026* | +€6m | −€485m | +€5m | −€475m | −0.41% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Singapore's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €11mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €11m |
| Private donations and purchases | €0.11bn |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.12bn |
Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €2.6bn from Russia in 2021 and €3.4bn in 2025 (+32%). It sold €0.41bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.12bn in 2025 (−71%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 88.3% of what it bought from Russia. For Singapore: €932m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Singapore's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crude oil | €0.31bn | €0.25bnrange €0.17bn to €0.36bn | €0.10bn | A |
| Oil products | €13.2bn | €12.4bnrange €8.8bn to €17.1bn | €18bn | A |
| LNG | €95m | €89mrange €61m to €0.13bn | €38m | A |
| Coal | €20m | €19mrange €13m to €26m | €13m | A |
| Other goods | €1.3bn | €2.9bn | – | |
| All goods | €14.9bn | €15.6bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Yes. Singapore has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 5 March 2022. They are export controls and financial measures, not a general sanctions regime. It applies export controls on Russia. Separately, Russia lists Singapore as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Singapore. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.28bn extra from 2022 (0.06% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.61bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen: <0.01% of a year's GDP (€46m; likely €0 to €230m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
€27m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Singapore; what its firms kept of it, <€1m, is taken off its support.
Russia took €337m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €192m to €873m; 0.07% of a year's GDP.
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.69bn (0.14% of one year's GDP). Singapore kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.26bn (0.05% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €30m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €29m to €118m); €110m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
31 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 64% modelled (C) and 36% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −0.41% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.5% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 75%). Chance toward Russia: 75%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Singapore moved €2.2bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Singapore kept more from selling to Russia). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 88.3% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €3.4bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €2.6bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
It bought €3.4bn from Russia in 2025 (€2.6bn in 2021), and sold €0.12bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Singapore moved €2.2bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Singapore kept more from selling to Russia).
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €30m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €29m to €118m); €110m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Singapore's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.12bn, 0.02% of one year's GDP (likely 0.01% to 0.08%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €82m; 2023 €14m; 2024 €11m; 2025 €7m; 2026 (to August) €6m. In total since 2022: €0.12bn (likely 0.01% to 0.08%).
Yes. Singapore has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 5 March 2022. They are export controls and financial measures, not a general sanctions regime. It applies export controls on Russia. Separately, Russia lists Singapore as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Singapore. Sources: Singapore MFA, Sanctions and restrictions against Russia, 5 March 2022; Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned).
Leaning toward Russia
31 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/singapore/