Is Kiribati helping Russia? What the money flows show
Kiribati's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept <€1m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (<€1m of <€1m). The net is 0.12% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.06% to 0.21% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
likely 0.06% to 0.21% toward Russia · <€1m · ≈ 0.03%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.12% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.12%
<€1m
likely 0.06% to 0.21% toward Russia very likely · >99%
Russia kept <€1m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (<€1m of <€1m).
Its story in short
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
Rough data: mostly estimates 99% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: <€1m of the net's <€1m.
Small economy A small economy (GDP €281m): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.12% · <€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Kiribati's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kiribati. Checked 27 October 2026.
In money terms the net is −0.12% of one year's GDP (likely 0.06% to 0.21% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept <€1m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (<€1m of <€1m). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Kiribati have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Kiribati's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kiribati.
Nearby in the ranking
Toward Russia
Mongolia−6.4%Leaning toward Russia · −€1.2bn · 77%
War Balance