War Balance

Is Bangladesh helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Bangladesh's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€8m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €53m (0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€903m; the other parts take €850m off it). The net is 0.01% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

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Toward Russia by

0.01% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine · €61m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.01% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 55%; 90% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

€8m

likely from 0.02% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.01%

€53m

likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €53m (0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€903m; the other parts take €850m off it).

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 55%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loans. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine.

What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €8m

Ukraine kept less from sales hereC−<0.01%€10m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC+<0.01%€3m
Bangladesh kept more from extra sales to UkraineC−<0.01%€2m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.01% · €53m

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesC−0.22%€903m
Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loansC+0.15%€636m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC+0.05%€207m
Bangladesh earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD−<0.01%€35m
Bangladesh kept less from selling to RussiaC+<0.01%€20m
Bangladesh kept less from services sold to RussiaC+<0.01%€15m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD+<0.01%€9m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC−<0.01%€5m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC+<0.01%€3m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD−<0.01%€1m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€61m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

YearSupport for UkraineTrade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)NetNet since 2022
2022−€5m+€21m+€16m+<0.01%
2023+€2m−€10m−€9m+<0.01%
2024+€1m−€62m−€61m−0.01%
2025−€1m+€4m+€4m−0.01%
2026*−€5m−€6m−€12m−0.01%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Support for Ukraine by type

Bangladesh's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

Military aid–
Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share)€3mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €3m
Private donations and purchases−€9m
Money flowing back−€2msubtracted
Support for Ukraine (the map's figure)−€8m

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

Military aid to Ukraine, every country →

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.80bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.61bn in 2025 (−23%). It sold €0.82bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.39bn in 2025 (−52%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 1.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Bangladesh: €5m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 76% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Bangladesh's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Bangladesh. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €75m extra from 2022 (0.02% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

Money flowing back from the war effort

€0.14bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Bangladesh; what its firms kept of it, €2m, is taken off its support.

Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.90bn (0.22% of one year's GDP).

Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

Neighbours by land

CountryNet, % of GDP
Bangladesh−0.01%−€61messentially zero
Myanmar−0.05%−€35messentially zero
India−2.2%−€70.6bnvery likely · >99%

How the number is backed

28 sources back its parts: 7 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 98% modelled (C) and 2% rough indications (D).

Data coverage

Sources, by part

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries C

Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loans C

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

Bangladesh earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions D

Bangladesh kept less from selling to Russia C

Every source of its parts (28)

Questions

Is Bangladesh helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 55%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €53m (0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€903m; the other parts take €850m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

Why is Bangladesh's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: −0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loans.

How does Bangladesh compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Bangladesh −0.01%, Myanmar −0.05%, India −2.2%.

Does Bangladesh trade with Russia?

It bought €0.61bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.80bn in 2021), and sold €0.39bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €53m (0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€903m; the other parts take €850m off it).

Where do the numbers for Bangladesh come from?

28 sources back its parts, 7 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics; Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loans: Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

Does Bangladesh have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Bangladesh's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Bangladesh.

Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

  1. Guyana−<0.01%Essentially zero · −<€1m · 68%
  2. Bermuda−<0.01%Essentially zero · −<€1m · 53%
  3. Niger−<0.01%Essentially zero · −€2m · 58%
  4. Bangladesh−0.01%Essentially zero · −€61m · 55%
  5. Nicaragua−0.01%Essentially zero · −€2m · 50%
  6. Qatar−0.02%Essentially zero · −€32m · 60%
  7. Bahrain−0.02%Essentially zero · −€8m · 53%

More about Bangladesh

Its parts, ranked against other countries

Every country, by year

28 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/bangladesh/