War Balance
Tanzania's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€6m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €816m (1.1% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€566m of €816m). The net is 1.1% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.63% to 1.6% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
Toward Russia by
1.1% of a year's GDP since 2022
very likely · >99%
likely 0.63% to 1.6% toward Russia · €821m · ≈ 0.24%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 1.1% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€6m
likely from 0.05% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
1.1%
€816m
likely 0.62% to 1.6% toward Russia very likely · >99%
Russia kept €816m (1.1% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€566m of €816m).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €6m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €6m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 1.1% · €816m
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesC | −0.78% | €566m |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.28% | €205m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.06% | €42m |
| Tanzania kept more from selling to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Tanzania kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.31bn.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −€1m | −€174m | −€175m | −0.24% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | −€308m | −€308m | −0.67% |
| 2024 | −€1m | −€162m | −€164m | −0.89% |
| 2025 | −€2m | −€96m | −€98m | −1.0% |
| 2026* | −€1m | −€75m | −€76m | −1.1% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Tanzania's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | −€6m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€6m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €0.12bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.24bn in 2025 (+100%). It sold €6m to Russia in 2021 and €61m in 2025. For Tanzania: €42m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Tanzania's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil products | no customs record | €0.20bnrange €0.12bn to €0.31bn | €78m | D (estimate) |
| Coal | no customs record | €5mrange €4m to €8m | €6m | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | – | €1.00bn | – | |
| All goods | – | €1.2bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: D, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Tanzania's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Tanzania. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.57bn (0.78% of one year's GDP).
In the map's ranking: number 13 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Rwanda | +0.55%+€74mlikely toward Ukraine · 90% |
| Burundi | +0.29%+€10mlikely toward Ukraine · 73% |
| Malawi | −0.02%−€3messentially zero |
| Zambia | −0.05%−€13messentially zero |
| Uganda | −0.07%−€33messentially zero |
| DR Congo | −0.09%−€63messentially zero |
| Kenya | −0.31%−€0.33bnlikely toward Russia · 90% |
| Mozambique | −0.85%−€0.16bnlikely toward Russia · 68% |
| Tanzania | −1.1%−€0.82bnvery likely · >99% |
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Ghana | −0.92%−€0.68bnvery likely · 99% |
| Oman | −1.4%−€1.4bnvery likely · >99% |
| Mauritius | −0.86%−€0.11bnvery likely · >99% |
| Côte d'Ivoire | −0.71%−€0.52bnvery likely · >99% |
20 sources back its parts: 5 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −1.1% of one year's GDP (likely 0.63% to 1.6% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €816m (1.1% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€566m of €816m). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
It bought €0.24bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.12bn in 2021), and sold €61m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €816m (1.1% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€566m of €816m).
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Rwanda +0.55%, Burundi +0.29%, Malawi −0.02%, Zambia −0.05%, Uganda −0.07%, DR Congo −0.09%, Kenya −0.31%, Mozambique −0.85%, Tanzania −1.1%. In the map's ranking: number 13 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
20 sources back its parts, 5 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics; Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Tanzania's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Tanzania.
Toward Russia · number 13 of 32
20 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/tanzania/