War Balance
Timor-Leste's support for Ukraine since 2022: €1m (0.06% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept <€1m (<0.01% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less paid for Russian services (<€1m; the other parts take <€1m off it). The net is 0.07% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.06% to 0.08% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Ukraine by
0.07% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely 0.06% to 0.08% toward Ukraine · €1m · ≈ 0.01%/yr
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.07% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.06%
€1m
likely 0.06% to 0.07% essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
<0.01%
<€1m
likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept <€1m (<0.01% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less paid for Russian services (<€1m; the other parts take <€1m off it).
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept less from services sold here. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely 0.06% to 0.08% toward Ukraine.
Supported Ukraine with 0.06% · €1m
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.06% | €1m |
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by <0.01% · <€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The one year with a net amount of note was 2022: +€1m.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€1m | −<€1m | +€1m | +0.06% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | +0.07% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | +0.07% |
| 2025 | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | +0.07% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | +0.07% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Timor-Leste's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Humanitarian aid | €1m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €1m |
Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and €0m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €0m in 2025. For Timor-Leste: €0 paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Timor-Leste's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Timor-Leste. Checked 27 October 2026.
1 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 0 of this project's own estimates. By size, 100% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 0% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D). No data: Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why
Its net is essentially zero: +0.07% of one year's GDP (likely 0.06% to 0.08% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept less from services sold here.
In money terms the net is +0.07% of one year's GDP (likely 0.06% to 0.08% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept <€1m (<0.01% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less paid for Russian services (<€1m; the other parts take <€1m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Timor-Leste's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €1m, 0.06% of one year's GDP (likely 0.06% to 0.07%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
1 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Aid: weapons, money, loans: Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Timor-Leste's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Timor-Leste.
Essentially zero
1 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/timor-leste/