War Balance

Is Thailand helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Thailand's support for Ukraine since 2022: €11m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €382m (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.08% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.22% toward Russia to 0.46% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

Open in the map →

Toward Ukraine by

0.08% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.22% toward Russia to 0.46% toward Ukraine · €393m · ≈ 0.02%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.08% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 68%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

€11m

likely from <0.01% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.08%

€382m

likely from 0.23% toward Russia to 0.46% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €382m (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war.

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Its story in short

What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 68%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.22% toward Russia to 0.46% toward Ukraine.

What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €11m

Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC+<0.01%€9m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC+<0.01%€1m

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.08% · €382m

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC+0.12%€582m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC−0.02%€96m
Thailand earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD−0.01%€69m
Its firms paid Russia more taxC−0.01%€64m
Thailand's companies made more profit in RussiaD−0.01%€57m
Thailand kept less from services sold to RussiaC+<0.01%€47m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate+<0.01%€39m
Thailand kept less from selling to RussiaC+<0.01%€8m
Thailand kept more from settling Russia's tradeD−<0.01%€7m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC−<0.01%€3m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD+<0.01%€2m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€0.39bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

YearSupport for UkraineTrade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)NetNet since 2022
2022−€3m+€395m+€392m+0.08%
2023+€2m+€345m+€347m+0.15%
2024+€11m−€60m−€49m+0.14%
2025−€1m−€320m−€320m+0.08%
2026*+€1m+€21m+€23m+0.08%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Support for Ukraine by type

Thailand's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

Military aid–
Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share)€9mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €9m
Private donations and purchases€1m
Support for Ukraine (the map's figure)€11m

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

Military aid to Ukraine, every country →

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €1.4bn from Russia in 2021 and €2.4bn in 2025 (+75%). It sold €0.90bn to Russia in 2021 and €1bn in 2025 (+16%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 55.8% of what it bought from Russia. For Thailand: €96m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Thailand's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

FuelCustoms (CIF)Map basis (FOB)Tracker (CREA)Quality
Crude oil€0.25bn€0.21bnrange €0.14bn to €0.29bn€0.19bnA
Oil products€0.28bn€0.22bnrange €0.15bn to €0.31bn€0.15bnC (estimate)
LNG€63m€57mrange €38m to €80m€63mA
Coal€0.16bn€0.14bnrange €94m to €0.19bn€0.22bnC (estimate)
Other goods€3.2bn€7.2bn–
All goods€4bn€7.8bn–

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

Every buyer, by fuel →

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Thailand's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Thailand. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.39bn extra from 2022 (0.08% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €31m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Its firms paid Russia more tax: €64m (0.01% of one year's GDP). Thailand's companies made more profit in Russia: €57m (0.01% of one year's GDP).

Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €39m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Thailand kept more from settling Russia's trade: €7m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €405m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €286m to €719m); €11m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

Neighbours by land

CountryNet, % of GDP
Laos+0.14%+€20mlikely toward Ukraine · 89%
Thailand+0.08%+€0.39bnessentially zero
Myanmar−0.05%−€35messentially zero
Cambodia−0.08%−€31messentially zero
Malaysia−0.64%−€2.5bnvery likely · 99%

How the number is backed

31 sources back its parts: 7 official statistics, 7 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 82% modelled (C) and 18% rough indications (D).

Data coverage

Sources, by part

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

Thailand earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions D

Its firms paid Russia more tax C

Thailand's companies made more profit in Russia D

Every source of its parts (31)

Questions

Is Thailand helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.08% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.22% toward Russia to 0.46% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 68%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €382m (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

Does Thailand still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 55.8% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €2.4bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €1.4bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

Does Thailand trade with Russia?

It bought €2.4bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.4bn in 2021), and sold €1bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €382m (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war.

How much has Thailand given to Ukraine?

Almost nothing that can be measured: €11m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

Why is Thailand's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.08% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.22% toward Russia to 0.46% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

How does Thailand compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Laos +0.14%, Thailand +0.08%, Myanmar −0.05%, Cambodia −0.08%, Malaysia −0.64%.

Does Thailand have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Thailand's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Thailand.

Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

  1. Palestine+0.09%Essentially zero · +€15m · 57%
  2. Gabon+0.08%Essentially zero · +€16m · 74%
  3. Panama+0.08%Essentially zero · +€63m · 78%
  4. Thailand+0.08%Essentially zero · +€393m · 68%
  5. Greece+0.08%Essentially zero · +€175m · 53%
  6. Peru+0.07%Essentially zero · +€187m · 80%
  7. Albania+0.07%Essentially zero · +€16m · 70%

More about Thailand

Its parts, ranked against other countries

Every country, by year

31 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/thailand/