Is Panama helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Q: Why is Panama's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.08% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.59% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

Q: Is Panama helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.08% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.59% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 78%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €63m (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

Q: How does Panama compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Colombia +0.15%, Panama +0.08%, Costa Rica +0.06%.

Q: Where do the numbers for Panama come from?

15 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept less from services sold here: Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

Q: Does Panama have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Panama's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Panama.

Panama's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €63m (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.08% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.59% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

Open in the map →

Toward Ukraine by

0.08% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.59% toward Ukraine · €63m · ≈ 0.02%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.08% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 78%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.08%

€63m

likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.59% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €63m (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war.

Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.09% of GDP less (€69m; likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.57% toward Ukraine)
Panama's own gain from trade with Russia: Panama kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€5m; likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Its story in short

Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 78%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.59% toward Ukraine.

What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.08% · €63m

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC	+0.09%	€68m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC	+0.01%	€11m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC	−0.01%	€9m
Panama kept more from shipping Russian oilD	−<0.01%	€7m
Panama kept less from services sold to RussiaC	+<0.01%	€2m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD	−<0.01%	€1m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2025: +€15m.

Year	Support for Ukraine	Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)	Net	Net since 2022
2022	+<€1m	+<€1m	+<€1m	+<0.01%
2023	−<€1m	+€10m	+€10m	+0.01%
2024	+<€1m	+€15m	+€15m	+0.03%
2025	+<€1m	+€15m	+€15m	+0.05%
2026*	+<€1m	+€23m	+€23m	+0.08%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €39m from Russia in 2021 and €29m in 2025 (−27%). It sold €2m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For Panama: €9m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Panama's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

Fuel	Customs (CIF)	Map basis (FOB)	Tracker (CREA)	Quality
Oil products	no customs record	€0.11bnrange €80m to €0.14bn	€0.41bn	C (estimate)
Other goods	–	€44m	–
All goods	–	€0.15bn	–

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: D, 2026, January to August: D. C and D are estimates.

Every buyer, by fuel →

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Panama's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Panama. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €43m extra from 2022 (0.06% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

Neighbours by land

Country	Net, % of GDP
Colombia	+0.15%+€0.52bnlikely toward Ukraine · 95%
Panama	+0.08%+€63messentially zero
Costa Rica	+0.06%+€45messentially zero

How the number is backed

15 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 92% modelled (C) and 8% rough indications (D). No data: Russian oil bought via other countries. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

Data coverage

Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

Sources, by part

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

Russia kept less from services sold here C

official Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia

Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

Every source of its parts (15)

Questions

Why is Panama's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.08% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.59% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.