Is Togo helping Ukraine or Russia? Too close to call
Togo's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€2m (−0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €41m (0.46% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€41m of €41m). The net is 0.48% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.5% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 50% toward Russia).
likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.5% toward Ukraine · €43m · ≈ 0.10%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.48% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: 50%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.02%
€2m
likely from 0.18% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.46%
€41m
likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.5% toward Ukraine too close to call: the middle value is toward Russia, but the simulations lean slightly toward Ukraine (51%)
Russia kept €41m (0.46% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€41m of €41m).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.45% of GDP more (€41m; likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.5% toward Ukraine)
Togo's own gain from trade with Russia: Togo kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1m; likely <0.01% to 0.03% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €18m (0.20% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €10m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Rough data: mostly estimates 51% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €41m of the net's €43m.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 50%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. No part flips it by shrinking; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here would have to be 236% larger.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.02% · €2m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−0.02%
€2m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.46% · €41m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.46%
€41m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.20%
€18m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.20%
€18m
Togo kept more from selling to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€26m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €32m from Russia in 2021 and €24m in 2025 (−27%). It sold €1m to Russia in 2021 and €13m in 2025. For Togo: €18m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Togo's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€1.2bn
€0.17bnrange €0.12bn to €0.23bn
€1.2bn
C (estimate)
Other goods
€0m
€0m
–
All goods
€1.2bn
€0.17bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Togo's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Togo. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €13m extra from 2022 (0.14% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €41m (0.46% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is too close to call, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
−1.0%−€0.20bntoo close to call · 64% toward Russia
How the number is backed
22 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 49% modelled (C) and 51% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found
Sources, by part
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
In money terms the net is −0.48% of one year's GDP (likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.5% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 50% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 50%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €41m (0.46% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€41m of €41m). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
What decides Togo's number?
Chance toward Russia: 50%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. No part flips it by shrinking; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here would have to be 236% larger.
Does Togo help Russia get around sanctions?
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers.
How does Togo compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Benin −0.36%, Togo −0.48%, Ghana −0.92%, Burkina Faso −3.9%.
We found no sanctions of Togo's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Togo.
War Balance