Is Sudan helping Ukraine or Russia? Too close to call
Sudan's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€6m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €88m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.21% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.98% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 54% toward Russia).
likely from 0.98% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine · €94m · ≈ 0.05%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.21% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 54%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.01%
€6m
likely from 0.12% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.20%
€88m
likely from 0.96% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine too close to call · 53% toward Russia
Russia kept €88m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.20% of GDP more (€88m; likely from 0.96% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine)
Sudan's own gain from trade with Russia: Sudan kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to <0.01% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €85m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Russian forces in the country Wagner Group or Russia's Africa Corps operated here: 2022, 2023. Paid to them and taken by their firms, at Russia's gain, against 2021: €124m.
Rough data: mostly estimates 51% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €134m of the net's €94m.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 54%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Less paid to Russian forces here (Wagner / Africa Corps). What decides it: if Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here were 71% smaller, the direction would flip.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · €6m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−0.01%
€6m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.20% · €88m
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−0.30%
€134m
Less paid to Russian forces here (Wagner / Africa Corps)D
+0.28%
€124m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.12%
€51m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.06%
€28m
Russia kept more from weapons sold hereD
−<0.01%
€1m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€17m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €0.26bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.40bn in 2025 (+57%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 0.29% of what it bought from Russia. For Sudan: €28m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2026. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Sudan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€0.85bn
€0.26bnrange €0.14bn to €0.40bn
€0.85bn
C (estimate)
Coal
€23m
€7mrange €4m to €11m
€25m
C (estimate)
Other goods
€6.2bn
€1.5bn
–
All goods
€7.1bn
€1.8bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Sudan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Sudan. Checked 27 October 2026.
−1.0%−€0.20bntoo close to call · 64% toward Russia
How the number is backed
19 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 49% modelled (C) and 51% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (90%) counts
Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, imf, mirror
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −0.21% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.98% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 54% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 54%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €88m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
What decides Sudan's number?
Chance toward Russia: 54%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Less paid to Russian forces here (Wagner / Africa Corps). What decides it: if Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here were 71% smaller, the direction would flip.
Does Sudan trade with Russia?
It bought €0.40bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.26bn in 2021), and sold €1m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €88m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war.
How does Sudan compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Ethiopia +<0.01%, Sudan −0.21%, Eritrea −0.32%, Egypt −0.43%, Central African Republic −4.8%, Libya −6.6%.
We found no sanctions of Sudan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Sudan.
War Balance