War Balance
Morocco's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€41m (−0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €142m (0.10% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€927m; the other parts take €785m off it). The net is 0.13% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.81% toward Russia to 0.78% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 59% toward Russia).
Toward Russia by
0.13% of a year's GDP since 2022
too close to call · 59% toward Russia
likely from 0.81% toward Russia to 0.78% toward Ukraine · €182m · ≈ 0.03%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.13% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly war-time prices on oil, largest in 2022).
Chance toward Russia: 59%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.03%
€41m
likely from 0.14% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.10%
€142m
likely from 0.77% toward Russia to 0.81% toward Ukraine too close to call · 57% toward Russia
Russia kept €142m (0.10% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€927m; the other parts take €785m off it).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 59%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 20% smaller, the direction would flip.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.03% · €41m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.03% | €42m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €3m |
| Morocco kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €1m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.10% · €142m
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.68% | €927m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.41% | €559m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +0.17% | €229m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €3m |
| Morocco kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Morocco kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.37bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −€12m | −€359m | −€371m | −0.27% |
| 2023 | −€5m | +€174m | +€169m | −0.15% |
| 2024 | −€4m | +€89m | +€85m | −0.09% |
| 2025 | −€13m | −€42m | −€54m | −0.13% |
| 2026* | −€7m | −€4m | −€11m | −0.13% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Morocco's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €3mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €3m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€42m |
| Money flowing back | −€2msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€41m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €1.6bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.55bn in 2025 (−66%). It sold €0.16bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.21bn in 2025 (+34%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 59.2% of what it bought from Russia. For Morocco: €927m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 7% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Morocco's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil products | €4.3bn | €1.9bnrange €1.4bn to €2.5bn | €5.4bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €1.2bn | €1.1bnrange €0.86bn to €1.4bn | €1.3bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €1.8bn | €1.2bn | – | |
| All goods | €7.4bn | €4.2bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: B, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Morocco's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Morocco. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.27bn extra from 2022 (0.20% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
€0.13bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Morocco; what its firms kept of it, €1m, is taken off its support.
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.23bn (0.17% of one year's GDP).
Its direction is too close to call, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Algeria | +0.02%+€36messentially zero |
| Morocco | −0.13%−€0.18bntoo close to call · 59% toward Russia |
25 sources back its parts: 4 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 87% modelled (C) and 13% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −0.13% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.81% toward Russia to 0.78% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 59% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 59%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €142m (0.10% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€927m; the other parts take €785m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Chance toward Russia: 59%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 20% smaller, the direction would flip.
It bought €0.55bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.6bn in 2021), and sold €0.21bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €142m (0.10% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€927m; the other parts take €785m off it).
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Algeria +0.02%, Morocco −0.13%.
25 sources back its parts, 4 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Morocco's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Morocco.
Too close to call
25 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/morocco/