War Balance
The Seychelles' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). The Seychelles moved €4m (0.23% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Seychelles kept more from selling to Russia, mostly income from shipping and insuring Russian oil (€3m of €4m)). The net is 0.22% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 3.2% toward Russia to 0.90% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 80%).
Leaning toward Russia by
0.22% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Russia · 80%
likely from 3.2% toward Russia to 0.90% toward Ukraine · €4m · ≈ 0.05%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.22% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Russia: 80%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
likely from 0.51% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.23%
€4m
likely from 3.2% toward Russia to 0.89% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 76%
The Seychelles moved €4m (0.23% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Seychelles kept more from selling to Russia, mostly income from shipping and insuring Russian oil (€3m of €4m)).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 80%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Its firms paid Russia more tax. No part flips it by shrinking; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here would have to be 165% larger.
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.23% · €4m
| The Seychelles kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −0.17% | €3m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.14% | €3m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.13% | €3m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.09% | €2m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.04% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€2m.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.04% |
| 2023 | +<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.09% |
| 2024 | +<€1m | −€2m | −€2m | −0.19% |
| 2025 | +<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.21% |
| 2026* | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.22% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
It bought €1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €0m in 2025. For the Seychelles: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of the Seychelles' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Seychelles. Checked 27 October 2026.
The Seychelles kept more from shipping Russian oil: €3m (0.17% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €3m (0.14% of one year's GDP).
15 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 30% modelled (C) and 70% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −0.22% of one year's GDP (likely from 3.2% toward Russia to 0.90% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 80%). Chance toward Russia: 80%; 100% of the other method choices agree. The Seychelles moved €4m (0.23% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Seychelles kept more from selling to Russia, mostly income from shipping and insuring Russian oil (€3m of €4m)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Chance toward Russia: 80%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Its firms paid Russia more tax. No part flips it by shrinking; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here would have to be 165% larger.
15 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: The Seychelles kept more from shipping Russian oil: Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports; Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of the Seychelles' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Seychelles.
Leaning toward Russia
15 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/seychelles/