War Balance
The Marshall Islands' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (0.19% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). The Marshall Islands moved €2m (0.90% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (The Marshall Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly income from shipping and insuring Russian oil (€2m of €2m)). The net is 0.71% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 2.9% toward Russia to 0.88% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 78%).
Leaning toward Russia by
0.71% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Russia · 78%
likely from 2.9% toward Russia to 0.88% toward Ukraine · €2m · ≈ 0.15%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.71% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Russia: 78%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.19%
<€1m
likely 0.06% to 0.39% very likely · 99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.90%
€2m
likely from 3.1% toward Russia to 0.68% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 83%
The Marshall Islands moved €2m (0.90% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (The Marshall Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly income from shipping and insuring Russian oil (€2m of €2m)).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 78%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil. What decides it: if The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil were 79% smaller, the direction would flip.
Supported Ukraine with 0.19% · <€1m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.90% · €2m
| The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −0.90% | €2m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The one year with a net amount of note was 2023: −€1m.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.08% |
| 2023 | +<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.31% |
| 2024 | +<€1m | −€1m | −<€1m | −0.46% |
| 2025 | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.63% |
| 2026* | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.71% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
The Marshall Islands' support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | €1m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €1m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold €1m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of the Marshall Islands' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Marshall Islands. Checked 27 October 2026.
The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil: €2m (0.90% of one year's GDP).
5 sources back its parts: 0 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 0 of this project's own estimates, plus 4 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 0% modelled (C) and 100% rough indications (D). No data: Russian oil bought via other countries · Fuel and goods bought from Russia · Sales to Russia · War-time fuel prices. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why
In money terms the net is −0.71% of one year's GDP (likely from 2.9% toward Russia to 0.88% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 78%). Chance toward Russia: 78%; 100% of the other method choices agree. The Marshall Islands moved €2m (0.90% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (The Marshall Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly income from shipping and insuring Russian oil (€2m of €2m)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Chance toward Russia: 78%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil. What decides it: if The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil were 79% smaller, the direction would flip.
5 sources back its parts, 0 of them official statistics. By part: The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil: Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of the Marshall Islands' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Marshall Islands.
Leaning toward Russia
5 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
УкраїнськаDeutschFrançaisPolskiNederlandsEspañol
Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/marshall-islands/