War Balance
Sao Tome and Principe's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €2m (0.29% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m of €2m). The net is 0.29% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 1.8% toward Russia to 0.51% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 71%).
Leaning toward Russia by
0.29% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Russia · 71%
likely from 1.8% toward Russia to 0.51% toward Ukraine · €2m · ≈ 0.06%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.29% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: 71%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.29%
€2m
likely from 1.8% toward Russia to 0.51% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 71%
Russia kept €2m (0.29% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m of €2m).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 71%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.29% · €2m
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.28% | €2m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€1m.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | €0 | −€1m | −€1m | −0.10% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.22% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.23% |
| 2025 | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.24% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.29% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and €0m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Sao Tome and Principe's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Sao Tome and Principe. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €2m (0.28% of one year's GDP).
3 sources back its parts: 0 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 2 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 0% modelled (C) and 100% rough indications (D). No data: Fuel and goods bought from Russia · War-time fuel prices. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why
In money terms the net is −0.29% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.8% toward Russia to 0.51% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 71%). Chance toward Russia: 71%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €2m (0.29% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m of €2m). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
3 sources back its parts, 0 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Sao Tome and Principe's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Sao Tome and Principe.
Leaning toward Russia
3 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/sao-tome-and-principe/