Is Indonesia helping Russia? What the money flows show
Indonesia's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€41m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €2.5bn (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.20% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.08% to 0.37% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
likely 0.08% to 0.37% toward Russia · €2.6bn · ≈ 0.04%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.20% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€41m
likely from 0.02% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.20%
€2.5bn
likely 0.07% to 0.36% toward Russia very likely · >99%
Russia kept €2.5bn (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.19% of GDP more (€2.4bn; likely 0.06% to 0.35% toward Russia)
Indonesia's own gain from trade with Russia: Indonesia kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€127m; likely from 0.05% toward Russia to <0.01% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Bought 180% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €991m in 2021, €2.8bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €2.3bn of the net's €2.6bn.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €41m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€54m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€14m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.20% · €2.5bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−0.18%
€2.3bn
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.04%
€445m
Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC
+0.03%
€366m
Indonesia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−<0.01%
€122m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC
−<0.01%
€12m
Indonesia kept more from settling Russia's tradeD
−<0.01%
€7m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD
+<0.01%
€4m
Indonesia kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€4m
Indonesia kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€2m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.73bn.
It bought €0.99bn from Russia in 2021 and €2.8bn in 2025 (+180%). It sold €1.3bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.7bn in 2025 (+34%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 14.7% of what it bought from Russia. For Indonesia: €366m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2026. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Indonesia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0.25bn
€0.19bnrange €0.15bn to €0.24bn
€0.18bn
A
Oil products
€1.9bn
€1.7bnrange €1.4bn to €2bn
€3.3bn
A
LNG
€0.22bn
€0.19bnrange €0.15bn to €0.23bn
€0.22bn
A
Coal
€3.6bn
€3.3bnrange €2.8bn to €4bn
€2.4bn
A
Other goods
€5.4bn
€6.2bn
–
All goods
€11.4bn
€11.6bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Indonesia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Indonesia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.27bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.45bn (0.04% of one year's GDP). Indonesia kept more from settling Russia's trade: €7m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €32m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €24m to €59m); €28m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 29 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. BRICS: number 6 of 6 members toward Russia.
28 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 83% modelled (C) and 17% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −0.20% of one year's GDP (likely 0.08% to 0.37% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €2.5bn (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Indonesia trade with Russia?
It bought €2.8bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.99bn in 2021), and sold €1.7bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €2.5bn (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war.
How does Indonesia compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Timor-Leste +0.07%, Papua New Guinea −0.08%, Indonesia −0.20%, Malaysia −0.64%. In the map's ranking: number 29 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
We found no sanctions of Indonesia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Indonesia.
War Balance