War Balance
Is Bahrain helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
Bahrain's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€2m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €7m (0.02% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€28m; the other parts take €21m off it). The net is 0.02% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.24% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Russia by
0.02% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.24% toward Ukraine · €8m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.02% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: 53%; 90% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€2m
likely from 0.03% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.02%
€7m
likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.24% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €7m (0.02% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€28m; the other parts take €21m off it).
- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.01% of GDP more (€5m; likely from 0.07% toward Russia to 0.25% toward Ukraine)
- Bahrain's own gain from trade with Russia: Bahrain kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€2m; likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 53%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.24% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €2m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Bahrain kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €1m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.02% · €7m
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.06% | €28m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.06% | €27m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Bahrain kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€12m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | +€3m | +€3m | +<0.01% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | −€12m | −€12m | −0.02% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | −€1m | −€2m | −0.03% |
| 2025 | −€1m | +€1m | +<€1m | −0.02% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | +€3m | +€2m | −0.02% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Support for Ukraine by type
Bahrain's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | −€1m |
| Money flowing back | −€1msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€2m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €27m from Russia in 2021 and €5m in 2025 (−81%). It sold €9m to Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025. For Bahrain: €2m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Bahrain's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Bahrain. Checked 27 October 2026.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€13m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Bahrain; what its firms kept of it, €1m, is taken off its support.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
How the number is backed
18 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 10 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 54% modelled (C) and 46% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Sources, by part
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- own estimate Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)
Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
Bahrain kept more from services sold to Russia C
Ukraine kept less from sales here C
Every source of its parts (18)
- own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- own estimate Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)
- method input net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results
- method input refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
- official Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia
- method input Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)
- method input Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums
- method input Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)
- method input Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute
- own estimate Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates
- official Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop_its6_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad
Questions
Is Bahrain helping Russia?
In money terms the net is −0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.24% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 53%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €7m (0.02% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€28m; the other parts take €21m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Why is Bahrain's net so small?
Its net is essentially zero: −0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.24% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
Where do the numbers for Bahrain come from?
18 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Does Bahrain have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Bahrain's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Bahrain.
Nearby in the ranking
Essentially zero
- Bangladesh−0.01%Essentially zero · −€61m · 55%
- Nicaragua−0.01%Essentially zero · −€2m · 50%
- Qatar−0.02%Essentially zero · −€32m · 60%
- Bahrain−0.02%Essentially zero · −€8m · 53%
- Cayman Islands−0.02%Essentially zero · −€2m · 56%
- Malawi−0.02%Essentially zero · −€3m · 50%
- Vietnam−0.03%Essentially zero · −€103m · 66%
More about Bahrain
Groups
Its parts, ranked against other countries
Every country, by year
18 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/bahrain/