War Balance
Its story in short
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €3.1bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.
Is Curaçao helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
Curaçao's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Curaçao moved €1m (0.03% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Curaçao kept more from selling to Russia, mostly earnings from sales to Russia (€2m; the other parts take €1m off it)). The net is 0.03% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.36% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Russia by
0.03% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.36% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine · €1m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.03% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Russia: 59%; 90% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.03%
€1m
likely from 0.36% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Curaçao moved €1m (0.03% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Curaçao kept more from selling to Russia, mostly earnings from sales to Russia (€2m; the other parts take €1m off it)).
- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.04% of GDP less (€1m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to 0.36% toward Ukraine)
- Curaçao's own gain from trade with Russia: Curaçao kept 0.07% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€2m; likely <0.01% to 0.41% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 59%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.36% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.03% · €1m
| Curaçao kept more from selling to RussiaC | −0.06% | €2m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +0.03% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<0.01% |
| 2023 | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.01% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.02% |
| 2025 | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.03% |
| 2026* | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.03% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold €2m to Russia in 2021 and €32m in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
Curaçao is a territory of Netherlands. We did not check whether the sanctions of Netherlands on Russia extend to it. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Curaçao itself; it names Netherlands. Checked 27 October 2026.
How the number is backed
11 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 7 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 69% modelled (C) and 31% rough indications (D). No data: Fuel and goods bought from Russia · War-time fuel prices. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found
Sources, by part
Curaçao kept more from selling to Russia C
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- official Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade
- official GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries D
Every source of its parts (11)
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- official Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade
- official GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- method input Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)
- method input Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums
- method input money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived
- own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
Questions
Is Curaçao helping Russia?
In money terms the net is −0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.36% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 59%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Curaçao moved €1m (0.03% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Curaçao kept more from selling to Russia, mostly earnings from sales to Russia (€2m; the other parts take €1m off it)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Why is Curaçao's net so small?
Its net is essentially zero: −0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.36% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries.
Where do the numbers for Curaçao come from?
11 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Curaçao kept more from selling to Russia: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Does Curaçao have sanctions on Russia?
Curaçao is a territory of Netherlands. We did not check whether the sanctions of Netherlands on Russia extend to it. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Curaçao itself; it names Netherlands.
Nearby in the ranking
Essentially zero
- Cayman Islands−0.02%Essentially zero · −€2m · 56%
- Malawi−0.02%Essentially zero · −€3m · 50%
- Vietnam−0.03%Essentially zero · −€103m · 66%
- Curaçao−0.03%Essentially zero · −€1m · 59%
- Australia−0.04%Essentially zero · −€607m · 76%
- Zimbabwe−0.05%Essentially zero · −€17m · 55%
- Zambia−0.05%Essentially zero · −€13m · 57%
More about Curaçao
Every country, by year
11 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/curacao/