War Balance
Is Malawi helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
Malawi's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €3m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.02% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.57% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Russia by
0.02% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.57% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine · €3m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.02% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more fuel bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 50%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.03%
€3m
likely from 0.57% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €3m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war.
- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.03% of GDP more (€3m; likely from 0.57% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine)
- Malawi's own gain from trade with Russia: Malawi kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.03% toward Russia to 0.06% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 50%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.57% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.03% · €3m
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.02% | €2m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€11m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +<€1m | +€11m | +€11m | +0.10% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | +0.09% |
| 2024 | +<€1m | −€5m | −€4m | +0.05% |
| 2025 | −<€1m | −€2m | −€2m | +0.03% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | −€7m | −€7m | −0.02% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €19m from Russia in 2021 and €37m in 2025 (+93%). It sold €18m to Russia in 2021 and €47m in 2025 (+164%). For Malawi: €1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2026, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Malawi's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Malawi. Checked 27 October 2026.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
Neighbours by land
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Malawi | −0.02%−€3messentially zero |
| Zambia | −0.05%−€13messentially zero |
| Mozambique | −0.85%−€0.16bnlikely toward Russia · 68% |
| Tanzania | −1.1%−€0.82bnvery likely · >99% |
How the number is backed
10 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found
Sources, by part
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- own estimate Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)
Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
Every source of its parts (10)
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
- own estimate Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)
- method input net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results
- method input refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
Questions
Is Malawi helping Russia?
In money terms the net is −0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.57% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 50%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €3m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Why is Malawi's net so small?
Its net is essentially zero: −0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.57% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
How does Malawi compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Malawi −0.02%, Zambia −0.05%, Mozambique −0.85%, Tanzania −1.1%.
Where do the numbers for Malawi come from?
10 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Does Malawi have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Malawi's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Malawi.
Nearby in the ranking
Essentially zero
- Qatar−0.02%Essentially zero · −€32m · 60%
- Bahrain−0.02%Essentially zero · −€8m · 53%
- Cayman Islands−0.02%Essentially zero · −€2m · 56%
- Malawi−0.02%Essentially zero · −€3m · 50%
- Vietnam−0.03%Essentially zero · −€103m · 66%
- Curaçao−0.03%Essentially zero · −€1m · 59%
- Australia−0.04%Essentially zero · −€607m · 76%
More about Malawi
Every country, by year
10 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/malawi/