War Balance
Its story in short
- Rough data: mostly estimates 60% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
Is the Cayman Islands helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
The Cayman Islands' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). The Cayman Islands moved €2m (0.02% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Cayman Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m; the other parts take <€1m off it)). The net is 0.02% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.26% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Russia by
0.02% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.26% toward Ukraine · €2m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.02% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Russia: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.02%
€2m
likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.26% toward Ukraine essentially zero
The Cayman Islands moved €2m (0.02% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Cayman Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m; the other parts take <€1m off it)).
- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.02% of GDP more (€1m; likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine)
- The Cayman Islands' own gain from trade with Russia: The Cayman Islands kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Its firms paid Russia more tax. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.26% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.02% · €2m
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.02% | €2m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.02% | €1m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.02% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The one year with a net amount of note was 2024: −€1m.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<0.01% |
| 2023 | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<0.01% |
| 2024 | +<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.02% |
| 2025 | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.02% |
| 2026* | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | −0.02% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
The Cayman Islands is a British overseas territory: the UK's sanctions on Russia apply there through the Russia (Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 2020. Separately, Russia lists the Cayman Islands as an “unfriendly” state (government order 3216-r, 29 October 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by the Cayman Islands. Checked 27 October 2026.
Sources
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
How the number is backed
9 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 34% modelled (C) and 66% rough indications (D). No data: Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Sources, by part
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
Russia kept less from services sold here C
Its firms paid Russia more tax D
Every source of its parts (9)
- own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
- official Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- method input net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results
- research Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings
- method input Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports
Questions
Is the Cayman Islands helping Russia?
In money terms the net is −0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.26% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree. The Cayman Islands moved €2m (0.02% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Cayman Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m; the other parts take <€1m off it)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Why is the Cayman Islands' net so small?
Its net is essentially zero: −0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.26% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Its firms paid Russia more tax.
Where do the numbers for the Cayman Islands come from?
9 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Russia kept less from services sold here: Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia; Its firms paid Russia more tax: Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Does the Cayman Islands have sanctions on Russia?
The Cayman Islands is a British overseas territory: the UK's sanctions on Russia apply there through the Russia (Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 2020. Separately, Russia lists the Cayman Islands as an “unfriendly” state (government order 3216-r, 29 October 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by the Cayman Islands. Sources: The Russia (Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 2020 (SI 2020/1571), Schedule 1; Government of Russia, Order of 29 October 2022 No. 3216-r amending the list (scanned).
Nearby in the ranking
Essentially zero
- Nicaragua−0.01%Essentially zero · −€2m · 50%
- Qatar−0.02%Essentially zero · −€32m · 60%
- Bahrain−0.02%Essentially zero · −€8m · 53%
- Cayman Islands−0.02%Essentially zero · −€2m · 56%
- Malawi−0.02%Essentially zero · −€3m · 50%
- Vietnam−0.03%Essentially zero · −€103m · 66%
- Curaçao−0.03%Essentially zero · −€1m · 59%
More about Cayman Islands
Every country, by year
9 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/cayman-islands/