Is Costa Rica helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Q: Why is Costa Rica's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.06% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.13% toward Russia to 0.84% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

Q: Is Costa Rica helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.06% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.13% toward Russia to 0.84% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 69%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €50m (0.06% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

Q: How does Costa Rica compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Panama +0.08%, Costa Rica +0.06%, Nicaragua −0.01%.

Q: Does Costa Rica trade with Russia?

It bought €63m from Russia in 2025 (€66m in 2021), and sold €32m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €50m (0.06% of GDP) less than without the war.

Q: Where do the numbers for Costa Rica come from?

19 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Ukraine kept less from sales here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

Q: Does Costa Rica have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Costa Rica's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Costa Rica.

Costa Rica's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€6m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €50m (0.06% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.06% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.13% toward Russia to 0.84% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

Open in the map →

Toward Ukraine by

0.06% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.13% toward Russia to 0.84% toward Ukraine · €45m · ≈ 0.01%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.06% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 69%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

€6m

likely from 0.04% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.06%

€50m

likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.85% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €50m (0.06% of GDP) less than without the war.

Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.06% of GDP less (€49m; likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.84% toward Ukraine)
Costa Rica's own gain from trade with Russia: Costa Rica kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€2m; likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.04% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Its story in short

Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 69%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.13% toward Russia to 0.84% toward Ukraine.

What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €6m

Ukraine kept less from sales hereC

−<0.01%

€6m

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.06% · €50m

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC	+0.08%	€63m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC	−0.02%	€14m
Costa Rica kept less from selling to RussiaC	+<0.01%	€2m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate	+<0.01%	€1m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC	−<0.01%	€1m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€16m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

Year	Support for Ukraine	Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)	Net	Net since 2022
2022	+<€1m	−€6m	−€6m	−<0.01%
2023	−€1m	+€17m	+€16m	+0.01%
2024	−€2m	+€14m	+€12m	+0.03%
2025	−€3m	+€10m	+€8m	+0.04%
2026*	−€1m	+€16m	+€15m	+0.06%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Support for Ukraine by type

Costa Rica's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

Military aid	–
Private donations and purchases	−€6m
Support for Ukraine (the map's figure)	−€6m

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

Military aid to Ukraine, every country →

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €66m from Russia in 2021 and €63m in 2025 (−5%). It sold €31m to Russia in 2021 and €32m in 2025 (+2%). For Costa Rica: €14m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Costa Rica's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Costa Rica. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

Neighbours by land

Country	Net, % of GDP
Panama	+0.08%+€63messentially zero
Costa Rica	+0.06%+€45messentially zero
Nicaragua	−0.01%−€2messentially zero

How the number is backed

19 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 11 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 99% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).

Data coverage

Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

Sources, by part

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

Every source of its parts (19)

Questions

Why is Costa Rica's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.06% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.13% toward Russia to 0.84% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.