War Balance
Is New Zealand helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
New Zealand's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.13bn (0.05% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€204m; the other parts take €203m off it). The net is 0.05% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.18% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Ukraine by
0.05% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.18% toward Ukraine · €126m · ≈ 0.01%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.05% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Toward Russia: mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere.
Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.05%
€127m
likely 0.04% to 0.10% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
<0.01%
€1m
likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.12% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €1m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€204m; the other parts take €203m off it).
- Russia's gain: Russia kept <0.01% of GDP more (€19m; likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.11% toward Ukraine)
- New Zealand's own gain from trade with Russia: New Zealand kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€18m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.18% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.05% · €127m
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.03% | €75m |
| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €49m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €4m |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Hosting refugeesD | +<0.01% | €1m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by <0.01% · €1m
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesC | −0.09% | €204m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.07% | €168m |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxD | +<0.01% | €16m |
| New Zealand's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +<0.01% | €13m |
| New Zealand kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €5m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€92m. Support for Ukraine fell from €56m in 2022 to €9m in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€56m | +€36m | +€92m | +0.04% |
| 2023 | +€23m | −€17m | +€7m | +0.04% |
| 2024 | +€21m | +€1m | +€22m | +0.05% |
| 2025 | +€9m | −€14m | −€5m | +0.05% |
| 2026* | +€17m | −€7m | +€10m | +0.05% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Support for Ukraine by type
New Zealand's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | €28mrange €21m to €35m; Kiel: €36m |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €9mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €4m |
| Humanitarian aid | €42m |
| Refugee hosting | €1m |
| Private donations and purchases | €47m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.13bn |
Quality of the split: C
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €55m from Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025 (−99%). It sold €0.14bn to Russia in 2021 and €24m in 2025 (−83%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 93.2% of what it bought from Russia. For New Zealand: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. New Zealand has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since March 2022. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists New Zealand as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by New Zealand. Checked 27 October 2026.
Sources
- MFAT, Russia Sanctions (Russia Sanctions Act 2022)
- Price Cap Coalition statement welcoming New Zealand as a member, 7 March 2024 (Japan MOF)
- US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements
- Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)
- ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'
The cost of switching away from Russian energy
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €30m extra from 2022 (0.01% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €83m; counted here: €75m — donated weapons at their market value; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€20m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in New Zealand; what its firms kept of it, <€1m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Russia took €3m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely <€1m to €24m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.20bn (0.09% of one year's GDP). More fuel bought from refiners abroad, some of it made from Russian crude, because its own refineries closed (New Zealand's Marsden Point in 2022; South Africa's Engen and SAPREF in 2020 and 2022). A structural change in supply, not a policy.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
How the number is backed
27 sources back its parts: 10 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 14% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 71% modelled (C) and 15% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Sources, by part
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries C
- official Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics
- official Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C
Aid: weapons, money, loans B
- official Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)
- research Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices
Private donations D
Its firms paid Russia less tax D
Every source of its parts (27)
- official Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics
- official Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- method input net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results
- method input refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins
- official Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)
- research Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices
- research Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere
- research Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings
- method input Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports
- official Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports
- official GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition
- method input Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports
- method input Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)
- method input Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums
- research Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding
- method input Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)
- method input Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute
- own estimate Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates
- official Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia
- official Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets
- official Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending
- official Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost
Questions
Is New Zealand helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.05% of one year's GDP (likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.18% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€204m; the other parts take €203m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How much has New Zealand given to Ukraine?
New Zealand's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.13bn, 0.05% of one year's GDP (likely 0.04% to 0.10%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Why is New Zealand's net so small?
Its net is essentially zero: +0.05% of one year's GDP (likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.18% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
Why does War Balance differ from the Kiel tracker for New Zealand?
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €83m; counted here: €75m — donated weapons at their market value; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026.
How much did New Zealand give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €56m; 2023 €23m; 2024 €21m; 2025 €9m; 2026 (to August) €17m. In total since 2022: €0.13bn (likely 0.04% to 0.10%).
Where do the numbers for New Zealand come from?
27 sources back its parts, 10 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Aid: weapons, money, loans: Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Does New Zealand have sanctions on Russia?
Yes. New Zealand has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since March 2022. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists New Zealand as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by New Zealand. Sources: MFAT, Russia Sanctions (Russia Sanctions Act 2022); Price Cap Coalition statement welcoming New Zealand as a member, 7 March 2024 (Japan MOF).
Nearby in the ranking
Essentially zero
- Trinidad and Tobago+0.06%Essentially zero · +€16m · 71%
- Mali+0.06%Essentially zero · +€14m · 57%
- Costa Rica+0.06%Essentially zero · +€45m · 69%
- New Zealand+0.05%Essentially zero · +€126m · 95%
- Argentina+0.05%Essentially zero · +€311m · 94%
- Philippines+0.04%Essentially zero · +€175m · 75%
- El Salvador+0.04%Essentially zero · +€11m · 58%
More about New Zealand
Its parts, ranked against other countries
- Government aid to Ukraine
- Private donations to Ukraine
- Company taxes paid in Russia
- Company profits in Russia
- Sellers' gain on sales to Russia
- Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine
- Company profits trapped in Russia
Every country, by year
27 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/new-zealand/