War Balance
Taiwan's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.20bn (0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €461m (0.06% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly paying Russia less than no-war prices (€494m; the other parts take €33m off it). The net is 0.09% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Ukraine by
0.09% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine · €659m · ≈ 0.02%/yr
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.09% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 64%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.03%
€197m
likely 0.02% to 0.08% essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.06%
€461m
likely from 0.35% toward Russia to 0.49% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €461m (0.06% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly paying Russia less than no-war prices (€494m; the other parts take €33m off it).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Ukraine: 64%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine.
Supported Ukraine with 0.03% · €197m
| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €150m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +<0.01% | €57m |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €9m |
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.06% · €461m
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +0.07% | €494m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.02% | €133m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.02% | €125m |
| Taiwan kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €56m |
| Taiwan kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €25m |
| Taiwan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −<0.01% | €23m |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxD | +<0.01% | €14m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €12m |
| Taiwan's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +<0.01% | €11m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€0.21bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.12bn in 2022 to €12m in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€124m | +€91m | +€215m | +0.03% |
| 2023 | +€26m | +€189m | +€215m | +0.06% |
| 2024 | +€22m | −€171m | −€148m | +0.04% |
| 2025 | +€12m | +€82m | +€94m | +0.05% |
| 2026* | +€13m | +€271m | +€284m | +0.09% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Taiwan's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | €0mKiel: €0m |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €4m |
| Humanitarian aid | €53m |
| Private donations and purchases | €0.14bn |
| Money flowing back | −€1msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.20bn |
Quality of the split: A
It bought €4bn from Russia in 2021 and €3.6bn in 2025 (−8%). It sold €1.1bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.50bn in 2025 (−55%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 63.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Taiwan: €494m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Taiwan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil products | €5.3bn | €5bnrange €3.3bn to €7.4bn | €6.7bn | C (estimate) |
| LNG | €1.5bn | €1.4bnrange €1bn to €2bn | €1.5bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €4bn | €3.8bnrange €2.7bn to €5.5bn | €4bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €8.2bn | €7.9bn | – | |
| All goods | €19.1bn | €18bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: B, 2024: B, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
Yes. Taiwan has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 2022. They are export controls on listed high-tech goods; it has no general sanctions list. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Taiwan as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Taiwan. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €1.2bn extra from 2022 (0.16% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €42m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €57m; counted here: €57m. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €43m. It is not counted here.
€43m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Taiwan; what its firms kept of it, €1m, is taken off its support.
Russia took €3m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely <€1m to €36m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.13bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Taiwan kept more from shipping Russian oil: €56m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €378m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €160m to €722m); €339m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
29 sources back its parts: 7 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 5% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 61% modelled (C) and 34% rough indications (D).
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 63.5% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €3.6bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €4bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Taiwan's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.20bn, 0.03% of one year's GDP (likely 0.02% to 0.08%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Its net is essentially zero: +0.09% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
In money terms the net is +0.09% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 64%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €461m (0.06% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly paying Russia less than no-war prices (€494m; the other parts take €33m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
It bought €3.6bn from Russia in 2025 (€4bn in 2021), and sold €0.50bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €461m (0.06% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly paying Russia less than no-war prices (€494m; the other parts take €33m off it).
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €0.12bn; 2023 €26m; 2024 €22m; 2025 €12m; 2026 (to August) €13m. In total since 2022: €0.20bn (likely 0.02% to 0.08%).
Yes. Taiwan has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 2022. They are export controls on listed high-tech goods; it has no general sanctions list. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Taiwan as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Taiwan. Sources: Taiwan MOEA export controls on Russia and Belarus (news report) (search summary, to be checked against the official text); US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements.
Essentially zero
29 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
УкраїнськаDeutschFrançaisPolskiNederlandsEspañol
Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/taiwan/