War Balance
Is Zambia helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
Zambia's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €12m (0.05% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.05% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Russia by
0.05% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine · €13m · ≈ 0.01%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.05% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more fuel bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 57%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€1m
likely from 0.01% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.05%
€12m
likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €12m (0.05% of GDP) more than without the war.
- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.05% of GDP more (€12m; likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine)
- Zambia's own gain from trade with Russia: Zambia kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 57%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €1m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.05% · €12m
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.03% | €7m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.02% | €5m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€4m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | −€4m | −€4m | −0.02% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | −€2m | −€2m | −0.03% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | −€3m | −€3m | −0.04% |
| 2025 | −<€1m | −€3m | −€4m | −0.05% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | +€1m | +€1m | −0.05% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Support for Ukraine by type
Zambia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | −€1m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€1m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €15m from Russia in 2021 and €35m in 2025 (+135%). It sold €2m to Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025. For Zambia: €5m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Zambia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Zambia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
Neighbours by land
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Angola | +0.25%+€0.26bnlikely toward Ukraine · 92% |
| Malawi | −0.02%−€3messentially zero |
| Zimbabwe | −0.05%−€17messentially zero |
| Zambia | −0.05%−€13messentially zero |
| DR Congo | −0.09%−€63messentially zero |
| Namibia | −0.83%−€0.10bnlikely toward Russia · 77% |
| Mozambique | −0.85%−€0.16bnlikely toward Russia · 68% |
| Tanzania | −1.1%−€0.82bnvery likely · >99% |
How the number is backed
14 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 96% modelled (C) and 4% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Sources, by part
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- own estimate Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)
Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
Ukraine kept less from sales here C
Every source of its parts (14)
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
- own estimate Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)
- method input net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results
- method input refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
- own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it
- method input Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)
- method input Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute
- own estimate Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates
Questions
Is Zambia helping Russia?
In money terms the net is −0.05% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 57%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €12m (0.05% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Why is Zambia's net so small?
Its net is essentially zero: −0.05% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
How does Zambia compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Angola +0.25%, Malawi −0.02%, Zimbabwe −0.05%, Zambia −0.05%, DR Congo −0.09%, Namibia −0.83%, Mozambique −0.85%, Tanzania −1.1%.
Where do the numbers for Zambia come from?
14 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Does Zambia have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Zambia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Zambia.
Nearby in the ranking
Essentially zero
- Curaçao−0.03%Essentially zero · −€1m · 59%
- Australia−0.04%Essentially zero · −€607m · 76%
- Zimbabwe−0.05%Essentially zero · −€17m · 55%
- Zambia−0.05%Essentially zero · −€13m · 57%
- Myanmar−0.05%Essentially zero · −€35m · 65%
- Dominica−0.06%Essentially zero · −<€1m · 55%
- Macao−0.06%Essentially zero · −€24m · 73%
More about Zambia
Its parts, ranked against other countries
Every country, by year
14 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/zambia/