War Balance
Dominica's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept <€1m (0.06% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly more tax paid in Russia by companies (<€1m; the other parts take <€1m off it). The net is 0.06% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 1.4% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Russia by
0.06% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 1.4% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine · <€1m · ≈ 0.01%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.06% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly taxes its companies pay in Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 55%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.06%
<€1m
likely from 1.4% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept <€1m (0.06% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly more tax paid in Russia by companies (<€1m; the other parts take <€1m off it).
Chance toward Russia: 55%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Its firms paid Russia more tax. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 1.4% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine.
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.06% · <€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.01% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.03% |
| 2024 | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.04% |
| 2025 | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.04% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.06% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Dominica's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Dominica. Checked 27 October 2026.
In money terms the net is −0.06% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.4% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 55%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept <€1m (0.06% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly more tax paid in Russia by companies (<€1m; the other parts take <€1m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Its net is essentially zero: −0.06% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.4% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Its firms paid Russia more tax.
We found no sanctions of Dominica's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Dominica.
Essentially zero
УкраїнськаDeutschFrançaisPolskiNederlandsEspañol
Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/dominica/