War Balance
Its story in short
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
Is Madagascar helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
Madagascar's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€2m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €4m (0.03% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.01% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.08% toward Russia to 0.38% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Ukraine by
0.01% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.08% toward Russia to 0.38% toward Ukraine · €2m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.01% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 59%; 90% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.01%
€2m
likely from 0.08% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.03%
€4m
likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.39% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €4m (0.03% of GDP) less than without the war.
- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.03% of GDP less (€4m; likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.39% toward Ukraine)
- Madagascar's own gain from trade with Russia: Madagascar kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to <0.01% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 59%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.08% toward Russia to 0.38% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · €2m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.01% | €2m |
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.03% · €4m
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.09% | €14m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.06% | €10m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€2m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | +€2m | +€2m | +0.01% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | −€2m | −€2m | −<0.01% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | +€1m | +€1m | +<0.01% |
| 2025 | −€1m | +€1m | +<€1m | +<0.01% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | +€1m | +€1m | +0.01% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Support for Ukraine by type
Madagascar's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | −€2m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€2m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €22m from Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025 (−97%). It sold €3m to Russia in 2021 and €10m in 2025. For Madagascar: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Madagascar's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Madagascar. Checked 27 October 2026.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
How the number is backed
12 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 62% modelled (C) and 38% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found
Sources, by part
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- own estimate Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
Ukraine kept less from sales here C
Every source of its parts (12)
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
- own estimate Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)
- method input net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results
- method input refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins
- own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it
- method input Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)
- method input Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute
- own estimate Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates
Questions
Why is Madagascar's net so small?
Its net is essentially zero: +0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.08% toward Russia to 0.38% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
Is Madagascar helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.08% toward Russia to 0.38% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 59%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €4m (0.03% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Where do the numbers for Madagascar come from?
12 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Ukraine kept less from sales here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Does Madagascar have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Madagascar's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Madagascar.
Nearby in the ranking
Essentially zero
- Guatemala+0.02%Essentially zero · +€18m · 71%
- Algeria+0.02%Essentially zero · +€36m · 57%
- Eswatini+0.01%Essentially zero · +€1m · 66%
- Madagascar+0.01%Essentially zero · +€2m · 59%
- Lesotho+0.01%Essentially zero · +<€1m · 80%
- Grenada+<0.01%Essentially zero · +<€1m · 68%
- French Polynesia+<0.01%Essentially zero · +<€1m · 95%
More about Madagascar
Every country, by year
12 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/madagascar/