Russia's state finance, arms sales and companies

Money that reaches Russia outside ordinary trade: payments for Russian nuclear projects and Russia's state loans, purchases of Russian weapons, and money moved by companies. Each is a yearly change against the pre-war level and shown in the country breakdown like any other part.

Details for developers: sources, cases and research files.

Nuclear projects and state loans from Russia

• Nuclear fuel is already in goods trade: nothing added.
• Construction by Rosatom (Egypt, Bangladesh, Hungary's Paks II, India, Iran, Uzbekistan) is in no trade data. Only the buyer's own share counts; the part paid with a Russian state loan is Russian money paying a Russian company.
• Repayments of Russia's state loans count only where they deviate from the pre-war schedule: a loan ending on schedule is not a war-time choice.
• Customs over-counts removed: equipment for Türkiye's Akkuyu plant is imported by Rosatom's own Turkish company.

Arrears caused by sanctions on payment channels still count (the money did not reach Russia); the panel says so. Belarus's deferrals were refinanced with new Russian loans, so they are left out.

Weapons bought from Russia

Russia's arms sales fell from about USD 15bn a year in 2019–2021 to 7–9bn after 2022. Arms are almost entirely outside customs data, so they are a part of their own, split by buyer from contracts and SIPRI data, against a no-war level without one-off contracts. They count at Russia's net gain on arms (about 0.04–0.05 of the price): India +0.19bn, China +0.18, Egypt +0.13, Algeria +0.10, Iran −0.07. Much of the fall was not the buyer's choice (Russia kept its output for its own army); the panel says so. Mostly educated guesses (certainty D; India and China C).

More buyers

18 more buyers come from SIPRI fact sheets (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Laos, Malaysia, Venezuela and others). Iran is counted once: part of its payments was settled in drones and missiles already counted as weapons sent to Russia.

Companies leaving Russia

Not in the totals; a marker on the map and a column in the full data download (below). By the company's home country:

• the exit fee Russia's budget requires for every sale since 2023;
• the forced discount: sales at least 50–60% below value hand the difference to Russian buyers (Renault, Société Générale, McDonald's, Shell...).

Assets seized by Russia

Also out of the totals, as a marker: company assets taken under temporary-management decrees (Uniper's Unipro, Fortum, Danone, Carlsberg), expropriation (Wintershall Dea, OMV, ExxonMobil, Shell), court seizures (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, Deutsche Bank, Linde) and leased aircraft kept by Russian airlines. About EUR 33bn (22–47), at the owners' own write-downs. Largest: Germany 9.5bn, the US 4.9, the UK 3.9, Austria 3.4, Ireland 2.8 (aircraft lessors).

Taken by Russia, not in the totals

Seizures and forced exit costs are a loss imposed on the country's companies and a gain for Russia, but the country did not choose to move that money; Russia took it. So they are in neither headline number. They appear as a square marker (layer "Taken by Russia") where Russia took at least 0.1% of a year's GDP, as a line in the panel, and in columns marked "not in totals" in the downloads. Largest, 2022 to August 2026 (EUR bn, seizures + forced exits): Germany 9.5 + 2.4, the US 5.0 + 5.2, France 0.7 + 6.1, the UK 3.9 + 3.9.

Russian-owned companies abroad

Profits Russian parents receive from their companies abroad, against 2019–2021: Lukoil's refineries (Bulgaria, Romania, the Netherlands), NIS in Serbia, Rosneft in India, Russian banks. Trusteeships that stopped transfers count toward Ukraine: Germany (Rosneft Deutschland, Gazprom Germania) about EUR 1.3bn. Metals, mining and chemicals plants (Rusal's Aughinish in Ireland, KUBAL in Sweden, NLMK, EuroChem, Uranium One) send little home: the change stays within ±EUR 0.05bn a year. Iraq (Lukoil, Gazprom Neft) uses the remuneration fees and the 35% tax in Iraq's EITI reports; Angola uses Alrosa's audited Catoca dividends, including RUB 19bn received in 2025 for the blocked dividends. Rosneft's Kurdistan pipeline is left out: its 2023–2025 shutdown came from the Iraq–Turkey arbitration, not the war. Mostly estimates (D), except Serbia, Angola and Iraq.

Frozen central-bank reserves

About EUR 260bn of the Bank of Russia's reserves have been frozen since 28 February 2022, about 185bn at Euroclear in Belgium. The frozen amount itself is not counted. What counts is the yearly return those reserves would have earned for Russia, about EUR 31bn over 2022 to August 2026: money Russia did not get.

• A line of its own, "Russian money frozen", added to the net only. It is not a payment, so it is not in Russia's earnings from trade; and it is not something given to Ukraine, so not in support for Ukraine.
• Who gets it: the freeze is an EU decision, so two thirds of Euroclear's and Clearstream's return go to all EU members by their share of EU aid, and one third to the host (Belgium, Luxembourg), which carries the legal risk. The one third is a judgement.
• Belgium's tax on Euroclear's Russian-asset income is already in its aid, so it is taken off first. The G7 loans repaid from this return are left out of donors' aid, so nothing is counted twice.

Largest, 2022–2026: Belgium EUR 7.4bn (1.2% of GDP), France 5.0, Germany 3.2, Italy 1.9, the UK 1.8.

Russian private assets frozen

Since round 39 the same line also counts the return Russian private owners lost on assets frozen abroad: sanctioned people's and firms' accounts and holdings, and Russian investors' securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream through Russia's sanctioned central depository. About EUR 18bn (10.5 to 26) over 2022 to August 2026, from the EU Commission, Belgium's Treasury, the UK's OFSI, Switzerland's SECO and the Bank of Russia's own statements. Only the financial part earns a return (not yachts, villas or art), at the same rates as the reserves. Every figure used excludes the central bank, so nothing is counted twice. The depositories' part is shared like the reserves; national freezes go to the country that froze them. Largest: Belgium +0.57% of GDP, Luxembourg +1.7%, Cyprus +0.6%. Money of Western investors blocked in Russia (type-C accounts) is not in it.

Russian forces: Wagner and Africa Corps

Since round 40, what host governments pay Wagner or Russia's Africa Corps for security, and what Wagner-linked firms take in gold, minerals and timber, counts as money toward Russia, at Russia's own gain on it (RUSI's evidence on costs and revenue), against the 2021 level: the Central African Republic's gold from the Ndassima mine (+4.4% of GDP, a small economy), Mali (its contract was agreed before the war, so only the 2024 build-up counts), Burkina Faso, Niger and Equatorial Guinea (Africa Corps since 2024); Sudan's and Libya's falls count the other way. Sources: RUSI, The Sentry, UN Panels of Experts, US, EU and UK sanctions designations. Certainty D. A tag, "Russian forces in the country", marks the years they were present.

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/method/russia-state-and-companies/