# Is Yemen helping Russia? What the money flows show

Yemen's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€3m (−0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €459m (5.2% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 5.2% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 1.4% to 8.6% toward Russia; very likely · 99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#YEM)

Toward Russia by

5.2% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 99%

likely 1.4% to 8.6% toward Russia · €462m · ≈ 1.1%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 5.2% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).

Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.03%

€3m

likely from 0.99% below zero to 0.36% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

5.2%

€459m

likely 1.4% to 8.5% toward Russia very likely · 99%

Russia kept €459m (5.2% of GDP) more than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 5.2% of GDP more (€459m; likely 1.4% to 8.5% toward Russia)
- Yemen's own gain from trade with Russia: Yemen kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €120m (1.4% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €26m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €328m of the net's €462m.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.03% · €3m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.03% | €3m |
| --- | --- | --- |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 5.2% · €459m

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −3.7% | €328m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −1.4% | €120m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.12% | €10m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€0.18bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€4m | −€129m | −€133m | −1.5% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −€5m | −€9m | −€13m | −1.6% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€6m | −€169m | −€175m | −3.6% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€4m | −€94m | −€90m | −4.6% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€8m | −€58m | −€50m | −5.2% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Yemen's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | −€3m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€3m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.21bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.34bn in 2025 (+64%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 4.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Yemen: €120m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Yemen's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €0.90bn | €0.79bnrange €0.45bn to €1.2bn | €1.2bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €0.53bn | €0.82bn | – | – |
| All goods | €1.4bn | €1.6bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: A, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Yemen's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Yemen. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#YEM)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €26m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €10m (0.12% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 4 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Saudi Arabia](https://warbalance.org/country/saudi-arabia/) | −0.30% · −€3.5bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Oman](https://warbalance.org/country/oman/) | −1.4% · −€1.4bn · very likely · >99% |
| Yemen | −5.2% · −€0.46bn · very likely · 99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Tunisia](https://warbalance.org/country/tunisia/) | −4.6% · −€2.1bn · very likely · 98% |
| [Libya](https://warbalance.org/country/libya/) | −6.6% · −€2.8bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Oman](https://warbalance.org/country/oman/) | −1.4% · −€1.4bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Tanzania](https://warbalance.org/country/tanzania/) | −1.1% · −€0.82bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

15 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 98% modelled (C) and 2% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (95%) counts
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Ukraine kept less from sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

## Questions

### Is Yemen helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −5.2% of one year's GDP (likely 1.4% to 8.6% toward Russia; very likely · 99%). Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €459m (5.2% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Yemen trade with Russia?

It bought €0.34bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.21bn in 2021). What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €459m (5.2% of GDP) more than without the war.

### How does Yemen compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Saudi Arabia −0.30%, Oman −1.4%, Yemen −5.2%. In the map's ranking: number 4 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Where do the numbers for Yemen come from?

15 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Yemen have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Yemen's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Yemen.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 4 of 32

7. [Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/country/turkiye/) · −3.1% · Toward Russia · −€32.7bn
6. [Uzbekistan](https://warbalance.org/country/uzbekistan/) · −4.1% · Toward Russia · −€4.1bn
5. [Tunisia](https://warbalance.org/country/tunisia/) · −4.6% · Toward Russia · −€2.1bn
4. Yemen−5.2% · Toward Russia · −€462m
3. [Hungary](https://warbalance.org/country/hungary/) · −6.0% · Toward Russia · −€11.4bn
2. [Libya](https://warbalance.org/country/libya/) · −6.6% · Toward Russia · −€2.8bn
1. [Kyrgyzstan](https://warbalance.org/country/kyrgyzstan/) · −10.0% · Toward Russia · −€1.4bn

## More about Yemen

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

15 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#YEM) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/yemen/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/yemen/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/yemen/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/yemen/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/yemen/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/yemen/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/yemen/