# Is Venezuela helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is near zero

Venezuela's support for Ukraine since 2022: €8m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €118m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.11% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 0.25% toward Ukraine; near zero · 71% toward Russia).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#VEN)

Toward Russia by

0.11% of a year's GDP since 2022

near zero · 71% toward Russia

likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 0.25% toward Ukraine · €109m · ≈ 0.02%/yr

Its share of IMF and World Bank lending + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.11% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more fuel bought from Russia).

Chance toward Russia: 71%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Share of IMF and World Bank lending only:

<0.01%

€8m

likely <0.01% to 0.06% essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.12%

€118m

likely from 0.48% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine near zero · 75% toward Russia

Russia kept €118m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.12% of GDP more (€117m; likely from 0.48% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine)
- Venezuela's own gain from trade with Russia: Venezuela kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Bought 632% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €116m in 2021, €851m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 71%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 0.25% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Share of IMF and World Bank lending only: <0.01% · €8m

| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €9m |
| --- | --- | --- |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.12% · €118m

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.07% | €67m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.05% | €51m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Venezuela kept more from selling to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2025: −€0.20bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€2m | +€38m | +€39m | +0.04% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€3m | +€31m | +€34m | +0.08% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€3m | −€13m | −€10m | +0.07% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | −€204m | −€204m | −0.15% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€1m | +€31m | +€32m | −0.11% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Venezuela's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €9mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €9m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €9m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.12bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.85bn in 2025 (+632%). It sold €1m to Russia in 2021 and €15m in 2025. For Venezuela: €51m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2025, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Venezuela's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €0.12bn | €100mrange €45m to €0.17bn | €95m | C (estimate) |
| Oil products | €1.1bn | €0.95bnrange €0.48bn to €1.5bn | €1.1bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0m | €0m | €7m | – |
| Other goods | €0m | €0.22bn | – | – |
| All goods | €1.2bn | €1.3bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Venezuela's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Venezuela. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#VEN)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €13m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€16m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Venezuela; what its firms kept of it, <€1m, is taken off its support.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is near zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Colombia](https://warbalance.org/country/colombia/) | +0.15% · +€0.52bn · likely toward Ukraine · 95% |
| [Guyana](https://warbalance.org/country/guyana/) | −<0.01% · −<€1m · essentially zero |
| Venezuela | −0.11% · −€0.11bn · near zero · 71% toward Russia |
| [Brazil](https://warbalance.org/country/brazil/) | −0.51% · −€10.1bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

21 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 10 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 98% modelled (C) and 2% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (85%) counts
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Its share of IMF and World Bank loans C

- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

### Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Its firms paid Russia more tax D

- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)

## Questions

### Is Venezuela helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.11% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 0.25% toward Ukraine; near zero · 71% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 71%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €118m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Venezuela trade with Russia?

It bought €0.85bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.12bn in 2021), and sold €15m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €118m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war.

### How much has Venezuela given to Ukraine?

Almost nothing that can be measured: €8m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

### Why is Venezuela's net so small?

Its net is near zero: −0.11% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 0.25% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

### How does Venezuela compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Colombia +0.15%, Guyana −<0.01%, Venezuela −0.11%, Brazil −0.51%.

### Where do the numbers for Venezuela come from?

21 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Its share of IMF and World Bank loans: [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Venezuela have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Venezuela's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Venezuela.

## Nearby in the ranking

Near zero

- [Colombia](https://warbalance.org/country/colombia/) · +0.15% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€524m · 95%
- [Laos](https://warbalance.org/country/laos/) · +0.14% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€20m · 89%
- [Dominican Republic](https://warbalance.org/country/dominican-republic/) · +0.13% · Near zero · +€147m · 86%
- Venezuela−0.11% · Near zero · −€109m · 71%
- [Belize](https://warbalance.org/country/belize/) · −0.13% · Near zero · −€4m · 82%
- [Taiwan](https://warbalance.org/country/taiwan/) · +0.09% · Essentially zero · +€659m · 64%
- [Palestine](https://warbalance.org/country/palestine/) · +0.09% · Essentially zero · +€15m · 57%

## More about Venezuela

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

21 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#VEN) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/venezuela/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/venezuela/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/venezuela/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/venezuela/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/venezuela/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/venezuela/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/venezuela/