# Is Uzbekistan helping Russia? What the money flows show

Uzbekistan's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€3m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Uzbekistan moved €4.1bn (4.1% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Uzbekistan kept more from selling to Russia). The net is 4.1% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#UZB)

Toward Russia by

4.1% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russia · €4.1bn · ≈ 0.88%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 4.1% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.

Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

€3m

likely from 0.09% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

4.1%

€4.1bn

likely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russia very likely · >99%

Uzbekistan moved €4.1bn (4.1% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Uzbekistan kept more from selling to Russia).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 3.4% of GDP more (€3.4bn; likely 1.2% to 5.4% toward Russia)
- Uzbekistan's own gain from trade with Russia: Uzbekistan kept 0.68% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€679m; likely 0.17% to 2.4% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €160m (0.16% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €495m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Bought 57% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €4.2bn in 2021, €6.5bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia 85% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.5bn in 2021, €2.7bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €3m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €4m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +<0.01% | €1m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 4.1% · €4.1bn

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −2.8% | €2.8bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Uzbekistan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.54% | €543m |
| Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD | −0.26% | €261m |
| Russia kept more from its nuclear projects and loansD | −0.21% | €210m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.16% | €160m |
| Uzbekistan kept more from selling to RussiaC | −0.08% | €82m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.05% | €50m |
| Uzbekistan kept more from settling Russia's tradeD | −0.04% | €40m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.02% | €20m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.01% | €12m |
| Uzbekistan's companies made more profit in RussiaD | −<0.01% | €8m |
| Uzbekistan kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €6m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +<0.01% | €3m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€1.5bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€1m | −€310m | −€310m | −0.31% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −€2m | −€496m | −€497m | −0.80% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€3m | −€1.5bn | −€1.5bn | −2.3% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€1m | −€807m | −€808m | −3.1% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€3m | −€992m | −€990m | −4.1% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Uzbekistan's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Humanitarian aid | €1m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€4m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€3m |

Quality of the split: B No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €4.2bn from Russia in 2021 and €6.5bn in 2025 (+57%). It sold €1.5bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.7bn in 2025 (+85%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 9.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Uzbekistan: €160m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. Depends on wages earned in Russia: remittances from Russia changed by +18.8% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: +€18.9bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely +€9.2bn to +€24.7bn); migrants sent €45.5bn home from Russia in that time. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Uzbekistan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €0.85bn | €0.77bnrange €0.66bn to €0.88bn | not tracked | C (estimate) |
| Oil products | €4.3bn | €3.9bnrange €3.4bn to €4.5bn | not tracked | C (estimate) |
| Pipeline gas | €1.6bn | €1.5bnrange €1.3bn to €1.7bn | not tracked | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €24.4bn | €22.3bn | – | – |
| All goods | €31.3bn | €28.4bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Uzbekistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Uzbekistan. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#UZB)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.50bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €0.26bn (0.26% of one year's GDP).

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Uzbekistan kept more from settling Russia's trade: €40m (0.04% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €20m (0.02% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €22m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €18m to €42m); €5m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 6 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. Central Asia: number 2 of 2 members toward Russia. Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion: number 2 of 4 members toward Russia.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Turkmenistan](https://warbalance.org/country/turkmenistan/) | +1.5% · +€0.57bn · likely toward Ukraine · 83% |
| [Kazakhstan](https://warbalance.org/country/kazakhstan/) | +0.02% · +€55m · essentially zero |
| [Tajikistan](https://warbalance.org/country/tajikistan/) | −0.40% · −€46m · too close to call · 58% toward Russia |
| [Afghanistan](https://warbalance.org/country/afghanistan/) | −1.5% · −€0.24bn · very likely · 98% |
| Uzbekistan | −4.1% · −€4.1bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Kyrgyzstan](https://warbalance.org/country/kyrgyzstan/) | −10.0% · −€1.4bn · very likely · 97% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Nepal](https://warbalance.org/country/nepal/) | −2.5% · −€0.97bn · very likely · >99% |
| [India](https://warbalance.org/country/india/) | −2.2% · −€70.6bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Afghanistan](https://warbalance.org/country/afghanistan/) | −1.5% · −€0.24bn · very likely · 98% |
| [Sri Lanka](https://warbalance.org/country/sri-lanka/) | −0.87% · −€0.70bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

33 sources back its parts: 9 official statistics, 7 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 74% modelled (C) and 26% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)

### Uzbekistan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions D

- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

### Russian owners kept more from their firms here D

- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)

### Russia kept more from its nuclear projects and loans D

- official · [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)
- official · [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)

## Questions

### Is Uzbekistan helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −4.1% of one year's GDP (likely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Uzbekistan moved €4.1bn (4.1% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Uzbekistan kept more from selling to Russia). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Uzbekistan trade with Russia?

It bought €6.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€4.2bn in 2021), and sold €2.7bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Uzbekistan moved €4.1bn (4.1% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Uzbekistan kept more from selling to Russia).

### Uzbekistan–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €6.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€4.2bn in 2021), and sold €2.7bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €3m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −4.1% of one year's GDP (likely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Does Uzbekistan help Russia get around sanctions?

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €22m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €18m to €42m); €5m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

### How does Uzbekistan compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Turkmenistan +1.5%, Kazakhstan +0.02%, Tajikistan −0.40%, Afghanistan −1.5%, Uzbekistan −4.1%, Kyrgyzstan −10.0%. In the map's ranking: number 6 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Where do the numbers for Uzbekistan come from?

33 sources back its parts, 9 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Uzbekistan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions: [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf); Russian owners kept more from their firms here: [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Uzbekistan have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Uzbekistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Uzbekistan.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 6 of 32

8. [Nepal](https://warbalance.org/country/nepal/) · −2.5% · Toward Russia · −€974m
- [Tuvalu](https://warbalance.org/country/tuvalu/) · −2.9% · Toward Russia · −€1m
7. [Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/country/turkiye/) · −3.1% · Toward Russia · −€32.7bn
6. Uzbekistan−4.1% · Toward Russia · −€4.1bn
5. [Tunisia](https://warbalance.org/country/tunisia/) · −4.6% · Toward Russia · −€2.1bn
4. [Yemen](https://warbalance.org/country/yemen/) · −5.2% · Toward Russia · −€462m
3. [Hungary](https://warbalance.org/country/hungary/) · −6.0% · Toward Russia · −€11.4bn

## More about Uzbekistan

### Groups

- [Central Asia](https://warbalance.org/group/central-asia/)
- [Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion](https://warbalance.org/group/russia-trade-hubs/)

### Compared with

- [Kazakhstan vs Uzbekistan](https://warbalance.org/compare/kazakhstan-vs-uzbekistan/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Profits of Russian-owned companies abroad](https://warbalance.org/russian-owned-companies-abroad/)
- [Rosatom projects and Russian state loans](https://warbalance.org/rosatom-and-russian-state-loans/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Payment agents settling Russia's trade](https://warbalance.org/payment-agents-for-russian-trade/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

33 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#UZB) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/uzbekistan/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/uzbekistan/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/uzbekistan/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/uzbekistan/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/uzbekistan/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/uzbekistan/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/uzbekistan/