# How much has the United States given to Ukraine since 2022?

The United States' support for Ukraine since 2022: €82.6bn (0.32% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €47.4bn (0.18% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €1.6bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 0.51% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.40% to 0.64% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#USA)

Toward Ukraine by

0.51% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.40% to 0.64% toward Ukraine · €132bn · ≈ 0.11%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.51% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by sanctions it set itself.

Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.32%

€82.6bn

likely 0.28% to 0.39% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.18%

€47.4bn

likely 0.09% to 0.30% toward Ukraine very likely · >99%

Russia kept €47.4bn (0.18% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.15% of GDP less (€39.9bn; likely 0.06% to 0.26% toward Ukraine)
- The United States' own gain from trade with Russia: The United States kept 0.03% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€7.5bn; likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.05% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% of GDP in returns (€1.6bn).

## Its story in short

- Cut through its own sanctions Of the €39.6bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 74% was required by sanctions it set itself (oil import ban of March 2022, EO 14066), 26% went beyond them.
- Bought 85% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €24.6bn in 2021, €3.8bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia 56% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €5.5bn in 2021, €2.4bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.32% · €82.6bn

| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.31% | €79.8bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Private donationsC | +<0.01% | €2.6bn |
| Hosting refugeesC | +<0.01% | €1.9bn |
| The United States kept back part of its aid, spent at homeB | −<0.01% | €1.2bn |
| The United States kept part of others' aid, spent hereB | −<0.01% | €702m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €280m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +<0.01% | €95m |
| The United States kept back part of its refugee spendingC | −<0.01% | €92m |
| The United States kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €57m |
| The United States kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)B | −<0.01% | €41m |
| The United States kept more from arms Ukraine bought hereB | −<0.01% | €34m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.18% · €47.4bn

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.15% | €38.5bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| The United States' companies made less profit in RussiaC | +0.02% | €4.7bn |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxC | +0.01% | €2.8bn |
| The United States earned less from Russian oil and gas stakesD | +<0.01% | €2.0bn |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €1.5bn |
| The United States kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €458m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €450m |
| The United States kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €444m |
| Russian owners kept less from their firms hereD | +<0.01% | €332m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €196m |
| The United States kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €103m |
| The United States earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −<0.01% | €24m |

Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% in returns · €1.6bn

| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC | +<0.01% | €837m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD | +<0.01% | €775m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€36bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €24.5bn in 2022 to €9.4bn in 2025.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€24.5bn | +€9.4bn | +€145m | +€34.1bn | +0.13% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€25.1bn | +€10.4bn | +€446m | +€36.0bn | +0.27% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€19.5bn | +€10.0bn | +€438m | +€29.9bn | +0.39% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€9.4bn | +€9.2bn | +€367m | +€18.9bn | +0.46% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€4.1bn | +€8.4bn | +€216m | +€12.6bn | +0.51% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

The United States' support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €47.4bnrange €36.9bn to €66bn; Kiel: €64.6bn |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €29.2bnof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €0.28bn |
| Humanitarian aid | €3.5bn |
| Refugee hosting | €1.9bn |
| Private donations and purchases | €2.7bn |
| Money flowing back | −€2.1bnsubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €82.6bn |

Quality of the split: C

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## United States–Russia trade

It bought €24.6bn from Russia in 2021 and €3.8bn in 2025 (−85%). It sold €5.5bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.4bn in 2025 (−56%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 55.8% of what it bought from Russia. For the United States: €450m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

The United States' purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €0.50bn | €0.44bnrange €0.35bn to €0.55bn | €0.40bn | A |
| Oil products | €4.6bn | €4.3bnrange €3.4bn to €5.4bn | €3.4bn | C (estimate) |
| LNG | €28m | €27mrange €21m to €33m | not tracked | A |
| Coal | €92m | €87mrange €65m to €0.11bn | €52m | A |
| Other goods | €22.4bn | €21.9bn | – | – |
| All goods | €27.6bn | €26.7bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: C, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 74% required by sanctions it set itself, 26% beyond what sanctions required.

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. The United States has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 6 March 2014. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. Separately, Russia lists the United States as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by the United States. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [OFAC, Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions (EO 14024 and related)](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/russian-harmful-foreign-activities-sanctions)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#USA)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €7.8bn extra from 2022 (0.03% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.36bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

Russian money frozen: <0.01% of a year's GDP (€1.6bn; likely €836m to €2.9bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.

Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: €4.7bn (September 2023, [source](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/11/06/where-are-the-russian-immobilised-assets-nobody-except-belgium-wants-to-say) (search summary, to be checked against the official text)); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: no public figure.

## Refugees from Ukraine

250,000 refugees from Ukraine, 0.7 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €1.9bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For the United States: €3.7bn spent on refugees, less €1.8bn, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €115bn; counted here: €79.8bn — donated weapons at their market value; G7 loans repaid from Russian assets left out (Russia pays for them); military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €3.6bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €10.2bn (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€54.3bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in the United States; what its firms kept of it, €2.1bn, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

The United States' companies made less profit in Russia: €4.7bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €2.8bn (0.01% of one year's GDP). The United States earned less from Russian oil and gas stakes: €2bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russian owners kept less from their firms here: €0.33bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €13.2bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €9.0bn to €23.0bn; 0.05% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €1.5bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). The United States kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.10bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €118m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €108m to €488m); €253m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 29 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. G7: number 6 of 7 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 23 of 23 members toward Ukraine.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Canada](https://warbalance.org/country/canada/) | +0.51% · +€10.6bn · very likely · >99% |
| United States | +0.51% · +€132bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Mexico](https://warbalance.org/country/mexico/) | +0.03% · +€0.41bn · essentially zero |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Canada](https://warbalance.org/country/canada/) | +0.51% · +€10.6bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Chile](https://warbalance.org/country/chile/) | +0.04% · +€0.11bn · very likely · 99% |

## How the number is backed

40 sources back its parts: 13 official statistics, 10 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 58% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 38% modelled (C) and 3% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
- Money flowing back: reported each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)

### The United States' companies made less profit in Russia C

- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)

### Its firms paid Russia less tax C

- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)

### Private donations C

- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- method input · [Audit of 31 major countries against Kiel, CREA, Eurostat, national statistics and government reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- own estimate · [Military aid delivered by 31 August 2026: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker release 31 allocation rows with delivery lead times by channel; US Department of Defense (Lead IG quarterly report Q1 2026) for USAI](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)
- research · [Return lost on Russian private assets frozen abroad: EU Commission, Belgian Treasury, OFSI, Swiss SECO, national authorities, Bank of Russia statements on securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine\_en)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)
- research · [Russian-owned metals, mining and chemicals plants abroad (Rusal, NLMK, Nornickel, EuroChem): company filings and parent reports](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=A&reporter=IE&partner=RU&product=281820&flow=2&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

## Questions

### How much has the United States given to Ukraine?

The United States' support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €82.6bn, 0.32% of one year's GDP (likely 0.28% to 0.39%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### United States–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €3.8bn from Russia in 2025 (€24.6bn in 2021), and sold €2.4bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €82.6bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +0.51% of one year's GDP (likely 0.40% to 0.64% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Is the United States helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.51% of one year's GDP (likely 0.40% to 0.64% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €47.4bn (0.18% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does the United States still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 55.8% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €3.8bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €24.6bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### United States–Russia trade: how much since 2022?

It bought €3.8bn from Russia in 2025 (€24.6bn in 2021), and sold €2.4bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €47.4bn (0.18% of GDP) less than without the war.

### How much did the United States give Ukraine each year?

Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €24.5bn; 2023 €25.1bn; 2024 €19.5bn; 2025 €9.4bn; 2026 (to August) €4.1bn. In total since 2022: €82.6bn (likely 0.28% to 0.39%).

### Does the United States have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. The United States has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 6 March 2014. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. Separately, Russia lists the United States as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by the United States. Sources: [OFAC, Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions (EO 14024 and related)](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/russian-harmful-foreign-activities-sanctions); [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 29 of 32

26. [South Korea](https://warbalance.org/country/south-korea/) · +1.1% · Toward Ukraine · +€18.1bn
27. [Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/country/switzerland/) · +1.0% · Toward Ukraine · +€8.7bn
28. [Canada](https://warbalance.org/country/canada/) · +0.51% · Toward Ukraine · +€10.6bn
29. United States+0.51% · Toward Ukraine · +€132bn
30. [Nigeria](https://warbalance.org/country/nigeria/) · +0.42% · Toward Ukraine · +€1.8bn
31. [Japan](https://warbalance.org/country/japan/) · +0.30% · Toward Ukraine · +€12.2bn
32. [Chile](https://warbalance.org/country/chile/) · +0.04% · Toward Ukraine · +€107m

## More about United States

### Groups

- [G7](https://warbalance.org/group/g7/)
- [NATO members](https://warbalance.org/group/nato/)

### Compared with

- [United States vs Germany](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-germany/)
- [United States vs China](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-china/)
- [India vs United States](https://warbalance.org/compare/india-vs-united-states/)
- [United Arab Emirates vs United States](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-arab-emirates-vs-united-states/)
- [Canada vs United States](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-united-states/)
- [United States vs United Kingdom](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-united-kingdom/)
- [United States vs Netherlands](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-netherlands/)
- [United States vs France](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-france/)
- [United States vs Poland](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-poland/)
- [United States vs Norway](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-norway/)
- [United States vs Italy](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-italy/)
- [United States vs Denmark](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-denmark/)
- [United States vs Sweden](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-sweden/)
- [United States vs Spain](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-spain/)
- [United States vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-switzerland/)
- [United States vs Ireland](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-ireland/)
- [United States vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-belgium/)
- [United States vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-japan/)
- [United States vs Finland](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-finland/)
- [United States vs Czechia](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-czechia/)
- [United States vs Austria](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-austria/)
- [United States vs Romania](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-romania/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Companies' cost of leaving Russia](https://warbalance.org/companies-leaving-russia-exit-cost/)
- [Company assets seized by Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-assets-seized-by-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Company profits trapped in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-trapped-in-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Stakes in Russian oil and gas projects](https://warbalance.org/stakes-in-russian-oil-and-gas-projects/)
- [Aid to Ukraine spent at home](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-spent-at-home/)
- [Frozen Russian central bank reserves](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-central-bank-reserves/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

40 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#USA) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/united-states/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/united-states/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/united-states/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/united-states/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/united-states/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/united-states/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/united-states/