# Is the United Arab Emirates helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia

The United Arab Emirates' support for Ukraine since 2022: €48m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €3.6bn (0.72% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.71% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 97%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#ARE)

Leaning toward Russia by

0.71% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Russia · 97%

likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine · €3.5bn · ≈ 0.15%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.71% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).

Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

€48m

likely from 0.02% below zero to 0.03% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.72%

€3.6bn

likely from 2.0% toward Russia to 0.22% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 97%

Russia kept €3.6bn (0.72% of GDP) more than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.68% of GDP more (€3.4bn; likely from 1.8% toward Russia to 0.25% toward Ukraine)
- The United Arab Emirates' own gain from trade with Russia: The United Arab Emirates kept 0.04% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€193m; likely from 0.45% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €1.8bn It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.8bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €299m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €48m

| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.01% | €62m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €15m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €7m |
| The United Arab Emirates kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €5m |

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.72% · €3.6bn

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.47% | €2.3bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.32% | €1.6bn |
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +0.12% | €589m |
| The United Arab Emirates kept more from settling Russia's tradeD | −0.03% | €134m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.01% | €62m |
| The United Arab Emirates' companies made more profit in RussiaD | −0.01% | €51m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €18m |
| The United Arab Emirates kept more from shipping Russian oilC | −<0.01% | €15m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +<0.01% | €12m |
| The United Arab Emirates kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €7m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€1.2bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€2m | −€125m | −€124m | −0.03% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€15m | −€1.2bn | −€1.2bn | −0.26% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€27m | −€1.2bn | −€1.2bn | −0.49% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€8m | −€674m | −€666m | −0.63% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€3m | −€399m | −€402m | −0.71% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

The United Arab Emirates' support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €7mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €7m |
| Humanitarian aid | €62m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€15m |
| Money flowing back | −€5msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €48m |

Quality of the split: B No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €3bn from Russia in 2021 and €3.9bn in 2025 (+29%). It sold €0.61bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.78bn in 2025 (+27%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 3.4% of what it bought from Russia. For the United Arab Emirates: €589m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

The United Arab Emirates' purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €1.2bn | €0.78bnrange €41m to €2.3bn | €0.38bn | C (estimate) |
| Oil products | €5.4bn | €12bnrange €3bn to €25.5bn | €15.1bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0.17bn | €0.16bnrange €49m to €0.34bn | €0.16bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €24.8bn | €8.6bn | – | – |
| All goods | €31.6bn | €21.6bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

No. The United Arab Emirates has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (2023). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the United Arab Emirates. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [UAE official to Reuters, 2023 (news report)](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/21/uae-says-not-flouting-ally-sanctions-as-its-economy-warms-to-russia) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#ARE)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.12bn extra from 2022 (0.02% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.18bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Its firms paid Russia more tax: €62m (0.01% of one year's GDP). The United Arab Emirates' companies made more profit in Russia: €51m (0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €185m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €100m to €339m; 0.04% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €1.6bn (0.32% of one year's GDP). The United Arab Emirates kept more from settling Russia's trade: €0.13bn (0.03% of one year's GDP). The United Arab Emirates kept more from shipping Russian oil: €15m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.8bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €978m to €3.6bn); €64m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Saudi Arabia](https://warbalance.org/country/saudi-arabia/) | −0.30% · −€3.5bn · very likely · 99% |
| United Arab Emirates | −0.71% · −€3.5bn · likely toward Russia · 97% |
| [Oman](https://warbalance.org/country/oman/) | −1.4% · −€1.4bn · very likely · >99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Namibia](https://warbalance.org/country/namibia/) | −0.83% · −€0.10bn · likely toward Russia · 77% |
| [Mozambique](https://warbalance.org/country/mozambique/) | −0.85% · −€0.16bn · likely toward Russia · 68% |
| [Egypt](https://warbalance.org/country/egypt/) | −0.43% · −€1.7bn · likely toward Russia · 95% |
| [Kenya](https://warbalance.org/country/kenya/) | −0.31% · −€0.33bn · likely toward Russia · 90% |

## How the number is backed

36 sources back its parts: 11 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 1% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 61% modelled (C) and 38% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### The United Arab Emirates kept more from settling Russia's trade D

- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [fuel hubs and flag registries (Eurostat oil balances, UN Comtrade own and partner records, port bunker sales), laundered-oil caps from fuel use, Belgian company tax 2022](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_cb\_oil?format=JSON&siec=O4600&geo=NL&unit=THS\_T&nrg\_bal=IMP&nrg\_bal=EXP&nrg\_bal=INTMARB&nrg\_bal=GID\_OBS&nrg\_bal=TO\_RPI\_RO&nrg\_bal=FC\_E)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)

## Questions

### Is the United Arab Emirates helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.71% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 97%). Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €3.6bn (0.72% of GDP) more than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does the United Arab Emirates trade with Russia?

It bought €3.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€3bn in 2021), and sold €0.78bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €3.6bn (0.72% of GDP) more than without the war.

### United Arab Emirates–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €3.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€3bn in 2021), and sold €0.78bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €48m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −0.71% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 97%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Does the United Arab Emirates help Russia get around sanctions?

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.8bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €978m to €3.6bn); €64m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

### How much has the United Arab Emirates given to Ukraine?

Almost nothing that can be measured: €48m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

### How does the United Arab Emirates compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Saudi Arabia −0.30%, United Arab Emirates −0.71%, Oman −1.4%.

### Does the United Arab Emirates have sanctions on Russia?

No. The United Arab Emirates has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (2023). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the United Arab Emirates. Sources: [UAE official to Reuters, 2023 (news report)](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/21/uae-says-not-flouting-ally-sanctions-as-its-economy-warms-to-russia) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Russia

- [Singapore](https://warbalance.org/country/singapore/) · −0.41% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2.0bn · 75%
- [Egypt](https://warbalance.org/country/egypt/) · −0.43% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.7bn · 95%
- [Marshall Islands](https://warbalance.org/country/marshall-islands/) · −0.71% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2m · 78%
- United Arab Emirates−0.71% · Leaning toward Russia · −€3.5bn · 97%
- [Namibia](https://warbalance.org/country/namibia/) · −0.83% · Leaning toward Russia · −€100m · 77%
- [Mozambique](https://warbalance.org/country/mozambique/) · −0.85% · Leaning toward Russia · −€165m · 68%
- [Serbia](https://warbalance.org/country/serbia/) · −1.4% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.1bn · 84%

## More about United Arab Emirates

### Groups

- [BRICS](https://warbalance.org/group/brics/)
- [Gulf states](https://warbalance.org/group/gulf-states/)
- [Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion](https://warbalance.org/group/russia-trade-hubs/)

### Compared with

- [United Arab Emirates vs China](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-arab-emirates-vs-china/)
- [United Arab Emirates vs United States](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-arab-emirates-vs-united-states/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Company assets seized by Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-assets-seized-by-russia/)
- [Payment agents settling Russia's trade](https://warbalance.org/payment-agents-for-russian-trade/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

36 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#ARE) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/united-arab-emirates/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/united-arab-emirates/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/united-arab-emirates/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/united-arab-emirates/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/united-arab-emirates/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/united-arab-emirates/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/united-arab-emirates/