# Is Tuvalu helping Russia? What the money flows show

Tuvalu's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1m (3.0% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€1m of €1m). The net is 2.9% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 1.9% to 6.0% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#TUV)

Toward Russia by

2.9% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 1.9% to 6.0% toward Russia · €1m · ≈ 0.63%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 2.9% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.01%

<€1m

likely <0.01% to 0.03% essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

3.0%

€1m

likely 1.9% to 6.0% toward Russia very likely · >99%

Russia kept €1m (3.0% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€1m of €1m).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 3.0% of GDP more (€1m; likely 1.9% to 6.0% toward Russia)
- Tuvalu's own gain from trade with Russia: Tuvalu kept 0% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€0; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
- Rough data: mostly estimates 100% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €1m of the net's €1m.
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €50m): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.01% · <€1m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 3.0% · €1m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −3.0% | €1m |
| --- | --- | --- |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.64% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −1.3% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −1.9% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −2.5% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −2.9% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Tuvalu's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Tuvalu. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#TUV)

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €1m (3.0% of one year's GDP).

## How the number is backed

3 sources back its parts: 0 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 2 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 0% modelled (C) and 100% rough indications (D). No data: Fuel and goods bought from Russia · Sales to Russia · War-time fuel prices. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: imf, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)

## Questions

### Is Tuvalu helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −2.9% of one year's GDP (likely 1.9% to 6.0% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1m (3.0% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€1m of €1m). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Where do the numbers for Tuvalu come from?

3 sources back its parts, 0 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Tuvalu have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Tuvalu's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Tuvalu.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia

9. [Azerbaijan](https://warbalance.org/country/azerbaijan/) · −2.5% · Toward Russia · −€1.7bn
- [Bhutan](https://warbalance.org/country/bhutan/) · −2.5% · Toward Russia · −€71m
8. [Nepal](https://warbalance.org/country/nepal/) · −2.5% · Toward Russia · −€974m
- Tuvalu−2.9% · Toward Russia · −€1m
7. [Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/country/turkiye/) · −3.1% · Toward Russia · −€32.7bn
6. [Uzbekistan](https://warbalance.org/country/uzbekistan/) · −4.1% · Toward Russia · −€4.1bn
5. [Tunisia](https://warbalance.org/country/tunisia/) · −4.6% · Toward Russia · −€2.1bn

## More about Tuvalu

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

3 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#TUV) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/tuvalu/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/tuvalu/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/tuvalu/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/tuvalu/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/tuvalu/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/tuvalu/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/tuvalu/